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Nevada's legal brothels offer a unique opportunity to 
study the problem of defining commercial speech. Although 
state law forbids advertisements of houses of prostitution 
in counties where brothels themselves are against law, 
brothel messages are abundant in Clark County, where any 
form of prostitution is illegal. The publishers of these 
messages claim they are constitutionally protected edito­
rial speech rather than advertisements which enjoy little 
or no First Amendment protection, thus confounding the 
efforts of prosecutors who say they would otherwise move 
to remove such messages from public display.
The thesis examines the development of the U.S.
Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine and those defi­
nitions of commercial speech which have been suggested by 
jurists and scholars. The limitations of these definitions 
are illustrated by applying them to the Nevada brothel 
messages.
Finally, a heuristic definition of commercial speech, 
based on the Masses standard currently used in adjudicat­
ing sedition cases is suggested. The position is taken
iii
that the line between commercial and non-commercial speech 
is the line between abstract economic discussion and 
incitement to a specific economic transaction. The 
strengths and weaknesses of the proposed definition are 
also illustrated by applying it to the brothel messages.
iv
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"[I]n a sense, advertising is the pornography of 
capitalism, intended to arouse desire for objects 
rather than for persons." (Farber 383-384)
Erotica has long been used by advertisers as a sales 
tool without raising constitutional concerns. But when it 
is sex itself that is for sale, in the case of legalized 
Nevada prostitution, the issue of whether or not brothel 
messages can be disseminated raises interesting First 
Amendment concerns in the area of commercial speech. 
Brothel prostitution is allowed by Nevada law in all but 
two of the state's 17 counties (NRS 244.345; see Appendix 
A). Advertising these houses of "ill fame or repute," as 
they are referred to in the law, is similarly prohibited 
in the two counties, Clark and Washoe, which contain the 
state's two largest cities, Las Vegas and Reno. Nevada 
Revised Statute 201.430 makes brothel advertising a misde­
meanor punishable by a $500 fine in those counties where 
houses of prostitution are prohibited; the law defines 
such advertising to include, "any display, handbill, pub-
2
lication of address, location or telephone number of a 
house of prostitution or of directions telling how to 
obtain such information" (See Appendix B).
Despite the law, there appears to be an abundance of 
brothel advertising in Las Vegas. Booklets and magazines 
distributed free in newsracks in high tourist traffic 
areas contain what appears, prima facie, to be advertis­
ing. These flyers, found under a variety of names, com­
monly contain maps giving directions to Nevada brothels, 
telephone numbers of those businesses, references to 
limousine service and other information in seeming viola­
tion of state statute. Most of the flyers also describe 
various brothels or offer comment on the role of prostitu­
tion in American society. As AIDS has increasingly become 
an issue of public concern, some of the messages claim 
brothels offer safe sex.
While the content of the messages varies somewhat, 
they all have one thing in common: all claim not to be 
advertisements, but constitutionally-protected editorial 
content, thus frustrating the efforts of county officials 
who say they would otherwise act to stop publication. Mah­
lon Edwards, the deputy district attorney in Clark County 
whose duties include prosecution under statutes regulating 
adult businesses, said the difficulty in drawing a legal 
distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech 
is at least one of the factors which keeps his office from 
acting against the publishers of brothel messages
3
(Edwards).
Edwards was not alone in his uncertainty. The line 
between speech more fully protected by the First Amendment 
and that which jurists and scholars have come to label 
"commercial speech" has never been distinct. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has evolved a complicated commercial speech 
doctrine. Nevertheless, as Rome and Roberts have pointed 
out, "To date, the Supreme Court has failed to formulate a 
precise definition of commercial speech" (108). While a 
few scholars have attempted definitions, no one definition 
seems adequate. The purpose of this thesis is to investi­
gate the difficulties of precisely defining commercial 
speech by applying extant definitions to examples of con­
temporary Nevada brothel messages. Then, a heuristic defi­
nition of commercial speech based on the standards the 
Court has come to apply to sedition cases is suggested. 
Although this definition, too, has its shortcomings, it is 
the position taken by this thesis that the definition is a 
valuable starting point from which to begin further 
research into the problem of defining commercial speech. A 
more workable definition of commercial speech is important 
because, without one, the status of more fully protected 
speech is threatened. As Simon has noted:
The lack of a workable definition presents serious 
questions about First Amendment theory and its appli­
cation . . . Many in the legal community are con­
cerned that diminished protection may spread from
4
commercial speech to "core" speech like an infectious 
disease. There is evidence in a number of cases that 
this fear is reasonable (216-218).
Despite the importance of clear definitions, the prob­
lem of distinguishing commercial from non-commercial 
speech has received scant attention. As Simon pointed out, 
"Both the Supreme Court and its critics have been rela­
tively unconcerned with the problem of defining commercial 
speech. Rather, discussion has mainly concerned the analy­
sis of the actual and proposed tests used in deciding dis­
putes" (219).
That does not mean that the definitional issue has 
been ignored. But neither scholars nor jurists have yet 
isolated a definition which is without significant prob­
lems. Justice William Brennan put the problem succinctly 
in his concurring opinion in Metromedia Inc. v. Citv of 
San Dieao;
I would be unhappy to see city officials dealing with 
the following series of billboards and deciding which 
ones to permit: the first billboard contains the mes­
sage, "Visit Joe's Ice Cream Shoppe"; the second, 
"Joe's Ice Cream Shoppe uses only the highest quality 
dairy products"; the third, "because Joe thinks that 
dairy products are good for you, please shop at Joe's 
Shoppe"; and the fourth, "Joe says to support dairy 
price supports: they mean lower prices for you at his 
Shoppe." (538)
This thesis will suggest means, grounded in well- 
accepted constitutional principles, by which to begin to 
make such determinations. But rather than deal in hypoth­
etical examples, it will utilize Nevada brothel messages 
as real instances on which to test theoretical definitions 
of commercial speech. By focusing these definitions on 
Nevada brothel messages, the workability of each defini­
tion should become apparent.
Nevada brothel messages are a particularly well-suited 
locus from which to examine the definitional problems sur­
rounding the commercial speech doctrine. In addition to 
ensuring definitions that are applicable to actual situa­
tions, the brothel messages themselves contain what 
appears to be a mixture of commercial and non-commercial 
elements. Such mixed messages have seemed especially dif­
ficult to deal with in definitional terms, as will be seen 
in subsequent chapters.
Also significant is that legal prostitution is an on­
going political issue in Nevada, both because of its eco­
nomic importance to some of the smaller counties and 
because of the public health issues it raises in an AIDS­
conscious era. A focus on brothel advertising also serves 
as a reminder that messages which raise genuine political 
concerns are not always those which one would intuitively 
categorize as fundamental to the First Amendment. Legiti­
mate political controversy can just as easily center on 
images which, as Justice John Paul Stevens wrote, "few of
6
us would inarch our sons and daughters off to war to pre­
serve the citizen's right to see" (Young v. American Mini 
Theaters. Inc. 70).
By applying abstract definitions to actual examples, 
one also avoids the danger of overemphasizing hypothetical 
concerns at the expense of sound theory. Simon has writ­
ten that, "[l]aw reviews have featured abundant materials 
on commercial speech. Few, however, have sought a defini­
tion precise enough to be useful in deciding cases . .
As a result, theoretical speculation has prevailed over 
application" (229-230). Pritchard has criticized much 
media law research for its institutional emphasis and its 
focus on precedent and the "correctness" of court deci­
sions. This institutional paradigm is fine, Pritchard 
said, for "the study of philosophy or moral principles," 
(56), but it is also limiting. To cite Friedman and Macau­
lay: "To make formal rules and formal institutions the 
center of attention, and to ignore the way events, values 
and people affect them would distort the picture badly" 
(32). Focus on extant brothel messages will offer insight 
into the actual ways in which communicators confront the 
commercial contours of First Amendment theory.
Before addressing in detail the definitional issues at 
the heart of this thesis, some theoretical background is 
needed. In Chapter Two, the evolution of current commer­
cial speech doctrine, as articulated in the relevant deci­
sions of the U.S. Supreme Court, is traced. Then, the
7
philosophical assumptions which inform the various posi­
tions the Court has taken with regards to First Amendment 
protection for commercial speech are discussed in Chapter 
Three. Contemporary Nevada brothel messages and their 
relationship with changes in state law are examined in 
Chapter Four. Those definitions that have been suggested 
by jurists and scholars are applied in Chapter Five to the 
brothel messages. The various definitional approaches are 
evaluated, with the advantages of and problems with each 
discussed. Finally, in Chapter Six, the problem of distin­
guishing commercial from non-commercial speech is analog­
ized to the Masses standard suggested by Judge Learned 
Hand: That the court recognize a difference between 
abstract speech and advocacy of specific acts. It is 
argued that if this standard works in the political 
sphere, it ought to be equally useful in the economic mar­
ketplace. Hard cases will no doubt remain. But this 
should not dissuade us from moving in the direction of 
greater definitional precision, if only to understand the 
limitations of any such attempt. Laurence Tribe has 
observed:
That there are and will remain hard cases —  is the 
coal company's ad proclaiming its concern for the 
environment and warning of the hazards of nuclear 
fuel commercial speech or political expression? —  is 
an insufficient reason either to return to the 
unprincipled extreme of excluding all commercial
speech from First Amendment protection or to embrace
the equally indefensible position that government
cannot stop someone from selling 7-Up claiming it to
be insulin. (895)
Tribe's observation points out two widely disparate 
views of the proper position of commercial speech in the 
scheme of the First Amendment. It is this author's hope 
that the definition to be proposed in this thesis is one 
that will be useful to students of the First Amendment, 
however their views diverge. In the final analysis, fos­
tering agreement between scholars with significantly div­
ergent political and legal philosophies by approaching 
definitional issues from a principled perspective all can 
agree with is the highest aspiration of this inquiry.
9
CHAPTER TWO 
THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
It will be helpful to examine the commercial speech 
doctrine in general before focusing on definitional 
issues. This chapter traces the development of commercial 
speech case law from its roots in the so-called "Jehovah's 
Witnesses" cases of the 1930s, through the 1970s when com­
mercial expression enjoyed expanded protection, to the 
late 1980s in which the protection enjoyed by such speech 
is again being curtailed.
Commercial speech —  which we might informally define 
as advertising or other commercial solicitation, until we 
can formulate a more precise definition later on —  occu­
pies a place unique in the scheme of ordered First Amend­
ment liberties. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that certain types of speech are beyond the protection of 
the Constitution, commercial speech is neither protected 
at the same level as political speech, nor fully outside 
the ambit of the First Amendment.
It is a well-established principle that the First 
Amendment's proscription of laws "abridging" freedom of 
speech is not absolute. As the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942):
10
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which have never been thought to raise any Constitu­
tional problem. These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
"fighting" words —  those which by their very utter­
ance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that 
such utterances are no essential part of any exposi­
tion of ideas, and are of such slight social value as 
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social inter­
est in order and morality. (571-572).
In addition to the above-cited categories of speech, 
the advocacy of imminent illegal activity has also been 
held undeserving of constitutional protection (Brandenburg
v. Ohio. 1969). Purely commercial advertising, too, was
at first held to be outside the protection of the First 
Amendment when the Court considered the issue of advertis­
ing and free speech in Valentine v. Chrestensen. decided 
the same year as Chaplinskv.
Valentine, like Chaplinskv. is one of the so-called 
"Jehovah's Witnesses cases" the Court heard in the 1930s 
and 1940s. Although Valentine is generally considered the 
first commercial speech case, Rome and Roberts have cor­
rectly pointed out that "[t]he Court's holding in Valen­
tine v. Chrestensen was not the inexplicable appearance of
11
a new rule and is properly viewed in its context with a 
number of prior decisions" (11).
These prior decisions include two cases significant to 
our inquiry: Lovell v. Griffin. Georgia (1938) and 
Schneider v. State of New Jersey. Town of Irvington. 
(1939). Both cases involved the dissemination of litera­
ture and alleged commercial solicitation by Jehovah's Wit­
nesses .
In Lovell. the Court unanimously struck down a Georgia 
municipal ordinance which prohibited the distribution of 
"handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind" with­
out a permit (447). The Court invalidated the ordinance on 
free speech grounds, holding that pamphlets were entitled 
to the same level of constitutional protection as were 
more traditional forms of the press, without addressing 
either the potential freedom of religion issue, or the 
commercial aspects of soliciting funds in return for reli­
gious tracts.
The following year, the Court decided Schneider and 
three companion cases, this time, in dicta. addressing the 
commercial aspects of the speech involved. In Schneider, 
the Court reversed the conviction of Clara Schneider, a 
Jehovah's Witness who was distributing religious litera­
ture door-to-door as well as seeking contributions to the 
sect. In Young v. California, city of Los Angeles, 
handbills advertised a meeting of the "Friends of the Lin­
coln Brigade," a gathering at which speakers would discuss
12
the Spanish Civil War. Admission was to be charged.
Nichols v. Massachusetts. City of Worcester and Snyder v. 
Milwaukee involved leaflets advertising a meeting protest­
ing unemployment insurance administration and labor pick­
eting, respectively.
Of the four cases, Schneider and Young directly 
involved the economic interests of the speaker, Schneider 
through direct solicitation, Young because of the admis­
sion charge for attending the meeting. The economic 
interest of petitioners was also a factor in the other two 
cases, albeit indirectly, since it cannot be denied that 
the financial well-being of picketers and those protesting 
unemployment insurance policies might be affected by the 
actions the speakers sought to protest.
The significance of economic motivation in distin­
guishing commercial from non-commercial speech will be 
discussed later. For now, it is sufficient to note that in 
all these pre-Valentine cases, the Court recognized a 
distinction between purely commercial activity and solici­
tation or advertising which was related to an activity 
which itself was constitutionally protected. In cases 
involving protected activity, the Court held that speech 
related to such endeavors, although otherwise possibly 
commercial, would be similarly protected.
The Commercial Speech Exception 
Valentine was the case in which the commercial speech
13
doctrine went beyond dicta. Although the Supreme Court 
treated the case as one involving "purely commercial 
advertising" (54), Valentine involved what might be termed 
"mixed speech," communication containing both commercial 
and political elements. The brothel messages examined in 
Chapter Four are much the same sort of "mixed speech." 
Valentine. then, deserves to be examined in detail, not so 
much because it is traditionally regarded as the seminal 
commercial speech case, but because of the similarity of 
the underlying communication to the brothel messages at 
the locus of our inquiry.
In 1940, F.J. Chrestensen, the owner of a former U.S. 
Navy submarine which he advertised in handbills as a 
"$2,000,000 fighting monster," applied for but was refused 
permission to dock and exhibit his vessel at New York 
City-owned docks at Battery Park. Chrestensen subsequently 
secured permission to conduct his submarine tour off a 
state-owned pier on the East River. He sought to advertise 
the exhibit through the use of handbills which depicted a 
cutaway diagram of the vessel and included the statement 
that guides would take sightseers on a tour of the subma­
rine's various compartments. "See how men live in a Hell 
Diver," the handbill stated. The handbill quoted admission 
prices of $.25 for adults and $.15 for children (Chresten­
sen 522) .
Chrestensen was informed that his advertisement would 
be illegal under a New York statute which prohibited
14
purely commercial handbills, but expressly allowed leaf­
lets advertising public protests. (New York City Sanitary 
Code, Health Department Regulations, Art. Ill, sec. 318.) 
Chrestensen revised his handbill in an attempt to conform 
to the law, removing all reference to the sale of tickets, 
or the price thereof, but retaining a map showing how to 
reach the submarine exhibit.
According to the federal appellate court which ruled 
in Chrestensen's favor:
In place of the schedule of prices appeared the 
statement, "The only submarine used for exhibition in 
the world"; instead of the insistent commands to 
"see" the described points of interests were only the 
drab statements that "Submarine S-49 contains" the 
torpedo compartment, the sleeping quarters, the 
kitchen, etc.; and the invitation to see life in a 
hell diver vanished completely. (512)
The other side of the brochure displayed four para­
graphs of closely-spaced type under the headline, "Subma­
rine Refused Permission To Dock At Any City Owned Pier By 
Commissioner Of Docks McKenzie." The paragraphs protested 
against the "almost unbelievable" action of the "dictato­
rial" subordinates of "a mayor who is one of the outstand­
ing liberals of the United States" by refusing Chrestensen 
permission to dock at the city-owned piers. The protest 
concluded that "while not as convenient for the visitors 
of Battery Park, by following the diagram on the other
15
side of this paper, it may be reached in about two (2) 
minutes" (Chrestensen v. Valentine 512).
Chrestensen was subsequently informed his revised 
handbill would also be illegal because of the information 
of a commercial nature on its face, but that he could dis­
tribute a flyer with only the information contained on the 
back of the handbill without interference.
Judge William Clark, writing for a majority of the 
appellate court, upheld a federal district court ruling 
that the New York City ordinance was unconstitutional as 
applied. Clark wrote that "Absolute prohibition of expres­
sion 'in the marketplace' is illegal, not to be saved by 
any commercial taint attached to the expression. . . . And 
borderline cases are to be resolved, not in favor of the 
regulation, but in favor of the cherished right" (515).
Nonetheless, Clark's decision was overturned by a 
unanimous Supreme Court in the terse Valentine decision. 
Rather than follow Clark's admonition that borderline 
cases be resolved "in favor of the cherished right," the 
Court simply dismissed Chrestensen's protest as subter­
fuge, saying it had been written "with the intent and pur­
pose, of evading the prohibition of the ordinance" (Valen- 
tjjQS 55) .
The Exception's Gradual Demise 
If Valentine v. Chrestensen were still good law, this 
inquiry into the definitional problems surrounding the
16
commercial speech doctrine might seem unnecessary, or at 
best purely academic. But the Court's ipse dixit approach 
to mixed speech has fared no better than the Valentine 
decision itself.
For a short time, it appeared the Court would broaden 
the new commercial speech doctrine and reach decisions 
incompatible with those announced in the pre-Valentine 
Jehovah's Witnesses cases discussed above. As "local 
authorities attempting to suppress the activities of the 
Witnesses tried to capitalize on the commercial speech 
exception . . . announced in Valentine." another group of 
cases soon reached the Court (Rome and Roberts 21). Since 
proselytization by Witnesses involved solicitation for 
funds to offset the cost of literature, prosecutors argued 
that the profit motive involved meant the resulting commu­
nication was commercial speech, unprotected by the First 
Amendment.
At first, the Court seemed to agree. In Jones v. 
Opelika. Kansas (1942) and several companion cases, the 
convictions of sect members were upheld. Justice Stanley 
Reed, writing for the 5-4 Court majority, argued that 
restrictions on solicitation were simply non- 
discriminatory "time, place and manner regulations" (594) 
which dealt only with commercial transactions "incidental 
to the exercise of religion or the freedom of speech or 
the press" (596). Citing Valentine, the Court noted,
"[C]ommercial advertising cannot escape control by the
17
simple expedient of printing matter in the public interest 
on the same sheet or handbill'1 (597).
In its initial Jones decision, the Court held that it 
made no difference that solicitation for funds played only 
a minor role in sect activities. Reed concluded that "to 
subject any religious or didactic group to a reasonable 
fee for their money-making activities does not require a 
finding that the licensed acts are purely commercial. It 
is enough that money is earned by the sale of articles" 
(596).
The following year, the Court decided Jamison v. Texas 
(1943). Jamison, a Jehovah's Witness, was convicted of 
violating an anti-handbill ordinance. The leaflets Jamison 
distributed announced a religious revival meeting on one 
side and on the other advertised that two books were 
available for $.25 to cover postage. The Court distin­
guished the case from Valentine, deciding that the motive 
in the Jamison case was to raise funds for religious pur­
poses rather than the acquisition of personal profit 
(417). Again, the Court looked to the activity underlying 
what might otherwise be considered commercial speech. Fol­
lowing Jamison. the Court reheard and vacated Jones and 
its companions, on the like reasoning that the solicita­
tion was religious in nature rather than purely commer­
cial. (319 US 105). The same year, the Court decided Mur­
dock v. Pennsylvania. a similar Jehovah's Witness case, in 
which it went beyond the protection of religion, noting,
18
in dictaf that "[t]he right to use the press for express­
ing one's views is not to be measured by the protection 
afforded commercial handbills" (111).
The distinction between protected religious or politi­
cal canvassing and unprotected commercial solicitation was 
further sharpened in Breard v. City of Alexandria (1951). 
In Breard. the Court upheld the conviction of a door-to- 
door seller of secular magazines. The case seemed on its 
face similar to those immediately preceding it, in that 
its outcome hinged on the motive of the speaker. As Rome 
and Roberts note, the case, "appears to hold that the 
profit motive in selling the magazines is sufficient to 
deprive the door-to-door solicitation of magazine sub­
scriptions of the protection of the First Amendment" (33).
However, a closer look at Breard reveals that the 
Court had moved away significantly from Valentine's abso­
lute denial of constitutional protection for commercial 
speech. Instead, in Breard. the Court balanced competing 
interests, acknowledging a conflict between "the pub­
lisher's right to distribute publications in the precise 
way that those soliciting for him think brings the best 
results," and "some householders' desire for privacy"
(Breard 644).
By 1959, Justice Douglas had observed that the Valen­
tine ruling "has not survived reflection" (Cammarano v. 
United States 514). But the exception of commercial speech 
from constitutional protection continued, if in name only,
19
until 1976, with the decision in Virginia Board of Phar­
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. The interven­
ing years saw the gradual demise of the commercial speech 
exception, as individual cases were distinguished from 
Valentine.
Following Breardf the Court next addressed the commer­
cial speech exception, albeit cursorily, in New York Times 
v. Sullivan (1964). Sullivan. more rightly viewed as a 
landmark case in the area of libel and defamation law, 
need not be discussed at length here. It will suffice to 
note that the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that 
because allegedly libelous statements were part of a paid 
advertisement, they were not entitled to constitutional 
protection. Justice William Brennan noted that the adver­
tisement "communicated information, expressed opinion, 
recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought 
financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence 
and objectives are matters of the highest public interest 
and concern" (376 U.S. at 266). To deny constitutional 
protection to such editorial advertisements, Brennan's 
opinion held, would "shackle the First Amendment in its 
attempt to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources" (266).
This distinction between purely commercial advertis­
ing, on the one hand, and advertising involving issues of 
public concern on the other, was further refined in Pitts­
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rela­
20
tions. (1973). The case involved the categorizing of 
classified advertisements in a daily newspaper under the 
headings "Male Help Wanted" and "Female Help Wanted." 
Appellants argued that such categories facilitated illegal 
sex discrimination in employment.
The Court viewed its task in Pittsburgh Press as 
deciding whether the advertisements more resembled the 
public interest editorial advertisement in Sullivan or the 
purely commercial speech of Valentine (413 U.S. 385). The 
Court had no difficulty deciding that "[i]n the crucial 
respects, the advertisements in the present record 
resemble the Chrestensen rather than the Sullivan adver­
tisement" (385).
The Court also dealt with Pittsburgh Press's argument 
that such restrictions interfered with the editorial dis­
cretion of a newspaper and that "if this package of adver­
tisement' and placement is commercial speech, then commer­
cial speech should be accorded a higher level of protec­
tion than Chrestensen and its progeny would suggest." 
(388). Justice Lewis F. Powell's majority opinion replied 
that:
Discrimination in employment is not only commercial 
activity, it is illegal commercial activity under the 
Ordinance. We have no doubt that a newspaper consti­
tutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad 
proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prosti­
tutes. Nor would the result be different if the
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nature of the transaction were indicated by placement 
under columns captioned "Narcotics for Sale" and 
"Prostitutes Wanted" rather than stated within the 
four corners of the advertisement. (388)
In an attempt to distinguish the legal difference (if 
not the substantive distinction) between permissible and 
non-permissible commercial speech, the Court went on to 
note that:
We emphasize that nothing in our holding allows gov­
ernment at any level to forbid Pittsburgh Press to 
publish and distribute advertisements commenting on 
the Ordinance, the enforcement practices of the Com­
mission, or the propriety of sex preferences in 
employment. Nor, a fortiori. does our decision autho­
rize any restriction whatever, whether of content or 
layout, on stories or commentary originated by Pitts­
burgh Press, its columnists, or its contributors. On 
the contrary, we reaffirm unequivocally the protec­
tion afforded to editorial judgment and to the free 
expression of views on these and other issues, how­
ever controversial (391).
The Court thus recognized a legal difference not only 
between commercial and non-commercial speech, but a dif­
ference in the level of protection to be afforded adver­
tisements, depending on their level of "public interest." 
This underlines the need to distinguish between these 
types of communication. As previously noted, attempts to
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define commercial speech will be the focus of Chapter Four 
and need not be discussed in detail here. But it should be 
pointed out that the 5-4 Pittsburgh Press decision con­
cerned the dissenters because of the definitional issues 
it seemed to raise but not answer. Chief Justice Warren 
Burger thought the decision represented "a disturbing 
enlargement of the 'commercial speech' doctrine" which 
would launch the courts on "a treacherous path of defining 
what layout and organizational decisions of newspapers are 
'sufficiently associated' with the 'commercial' parts of 
the papers as to be constitutionally unprotected and 
therefore subject to governmental regulation" (293). Jus­
tice Potter Stewart was concerned that Pittsburgh Press 
was "the first case in this or any other American court 
that permits a government agency to enter a composing room
of a newspaper and dictate to the publisher the layout and
makeup of the newspaper's pages" (402).
Justice Douglas agreed, again explicitly repudiating 
his vote in the unanimous Valentine decision. He wrote 
that:
I believe that commercial materials also have First 
Amendment protection. If Empire Industries Ltd. . . .
wanted to run full-page advertisements denouncing or
criticizing this Pennsylvania law, I see no way in 
which Pittsburgh Press could be censored or punished 
for running the ad, any more than a person could be 
punished for uttering the contents of the ad in a
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public address at Independence Hall. (398)
Pittsburgh Press is not the only time the Court was 
able to avoid difficult commercial speech issues by rely­
ing on the legal status of the conduct underlying the 
speech. The changing legal status of abortion in 1973 
also allowed the Court to decide a difficult case by look­
ing at the conduct which the commercial speech was about. 
In Bigelow v. Virginiar (1973), however, the Court decided 
in favor of the commercial speech in question. Bigelow was 
the managing editor of an "underground" newspaper at the 
University of Virginia that accepted an advertisement 
announcing the availability of legal abortions in New 
York. He was charged with violating a Virginia criminal 
statute making it unlawful to "encourage or promote the 
procuring of abortion or miscarriage," in any publication, 
lecture or advertisement. (421 US at 813.) The Virginia 
Supreme Court, relying on Valentine. rejected Bigelow's 
appeal in 1972.
During the pendency of Bigelow's appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Court decided Roe v. Wade. (1973), 
outlawing state control of abortion in the first trimes­
ter, and remanded Bigelow to the state court. The Virginia 
court again decided against the plaintiff.
The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1975, 
and the conviction was overturned at least in part because 
the commercial speech involved dealt with the constitu­
tional considerations in Roe and Doe v. Bolton. (1973).
24
But the Court went further. Justice Harry Blackmun, for 
the Court, stated that "Virginia is really asserting an 
interest in regulating what Virginians may hear or read 
about the New York services." (827-828) In addition, 
Blackmun argued, the Bigelow advertisement: 
conveyed information of potential interest and value 
to a diverse audience —  not only to readers possibly 
in need of the services offered, but also to those 
with a general curiosity about, or general interest 
in, the subject matter . . . and to readers seeking 
reform in Virginia. (811)
The Court distinguished Bigelow from Valentine. 
calling the latter's holding "distinctly a limited one" 
(819), somewhat unconvincingly perhaps, in light of the 
earlier case's sweeping language.
A year later, the Court stopped distinguishing indi­
vidual cases, and explicitly overturned Valentine in 
Virginia state Board of Pharmacy. In BQar<3 Of. pharmacy, 
the Court dealt with the purely commercial advertising of 
drug prices. A consumer group challenged Virginia law pro­
hibiting the advertisement of drug prices, giving the 
Court the opportunity to deal squarely with the commercial 
speech exception.
As Justice Blackmun's opinion in the Board of Pharmacy 
case pointed out:
Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any 
subject, cultural, philosophical, or political. He
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does not wish to report any particularly newsworthy 
fact or to make generalized observations even about 
commercial matters. The "idea" he wishes to communi­
cate is simply this: "I will sell you the X prescrip­
tion drug at the Y price." (761)
In striking down the Virginia law, the Court looked 
not at the constitutional interests of advertisers, but to 
the First Amendment rights of the receivers of informa­
tion. Citing Lamont v. Postmaster General. (1965) and 
Procunier v. Martinez. (1974), the Court held that "where 
a speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection 
afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its 
recipients" (756). Thus, the Court considered the individ­
ual consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial 
information. "[T]hat interest may be as keen, if not 
keener, by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent 
political debate," Justice Blackmun observed (763).
Moreover, in a free market economy, commercial infor­
mation was vital to informed decision-making, the Court 
noted. The state's position that allowing advertising 
might harm the professionalism of pharmacists was rejected 
as "highly paternalistic" (770). Blackmun argued that the 
idea behind the First Amendment was to provide people with 
more, not less communication, and that closing channels of 
communication was not the best way to serve the public 
interest.
The Court also acknowledged the potential definitional
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difficulties inherent in a continued commercial speech 
exception. Blackmun commented that "no line between pub­
licly 'interesting7 or 'important7 commercial advertising 
and the opposite kind could ever be drawn," (765) and went 
on to observe:
Our pharmacist could cast himself as a commentator on 
store-to-store disparities in drug prices, giving his 
own and those of a competitor as proof. We see little 
point in requiring him to do so, and little differ­
ence if he does not. (765)
Retrenchment
Perhaps because of the sweeping language of Virginia 
Board of Pharmacy, as well as the fact that the next few 
commercial speech decisions relied on its holding and 
dicta. there has been a tendency on the part of some 
commentators to view the commercial speech exception as, 
with few exceptions, moribund. Overbeck and Pullen view 
the Virginia Board of Pharmacy case as the most important 
modern commercial speech decision, with subsequent cases 
expanding First Amendment protection for commercial and 
corporate speech. (283-288) Cohen and Kaplan take a simi­
lar position, casting the Virginia decision as the central 
case, and the subsequent holdings as either expanding pro­
tection or narrowly defining exceptions to this new, anti- 
paternal doctrine. (194-205)
To be sure, in 1977, the Court relied on Virginia
27
Board of Pharmacy to declare unconstitutional an ordinance 
outlawing truthful "for sale" and "sold" signs in residen­
tial areas in Linmark Associates v. Willinaboro. And the 
following year, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bel- 
lotti, the Court ruled that in commercial speech cases the 
state must meet the same exacting standards —  a compel­
ling interest and closely drawn means — which apply to 
"core" First Amendment speech.
In addition, a series of attorney advertising cases 
extended, within limitations, First Amendment protection 
to at least some forms of lawyer advertising. In Bates v. 
State Bar of Arizona (1977), the Court cited the potential 
interest to listeners in upholding a legal clinic's right 
to advertise "legal service at reasonable prices."
Although in-person solicitation is distinguished from pro­
tected commercial speech in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
(1978), protection was extended to a lawyer's newspaper 
advertisement aimed at potential product liability plain­
tiffs in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
(1985).
It must be emphasized, however, that although Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy overturned Valentine, it did not 
elevate commercial speech to the status of other communi­
cation protected by the First Amendment. The limited ques­
tion in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, as phrased by Black­
mun, was whether the state could completely suppress 
truthful information about lawful activity. In Bates. the
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Court put it even more succinctly, noting in dicta that 
"advertising that is false, deceptive or misleading . . . 
is subject to restraint," (384) and that "advertising con­
cerning transactions that are themselves illegal obviously 
may be suppressed" (384).
The notion that communication must be truthful is for­
eign to the rest of the First Amendment. As Justice Powell 
wrote for the majority in Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc.. 
(1974), "Under the First Amendment, there is no such thing 
as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, 
we depend for its correction, not on the conscience of 
judges and juries, but on the competition of other ideas" 
(339). As shall be seen in Chapter Three, the justifica­
tion for this lower level of protection —  that commercial 
speech is somehow hardier and more verifiable than other 
types of speech —  is open to debate. In fact, the Court 
itself has admitted on one occasion that commercial infor­
mation is not always subject to verification. ('National 
Commission on Egg Nutrition v. FTC) In addition, the 
advocacy of illegal activity is not always unprotected. 
While incitement to specific illegal acts has been held to 
be outside the protection of the First Amendment, the 
Court has held that the advocacy of such activity in the 
abstract cannot be proscribed (Brandenburg).
The post-Virainia Board of Pharmacy cases also distin­
guish protection afforded commercial speech from that to 
which core speech is entitled in another important
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respect. In Bates. the Court observed that "since adver­
tising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems 
unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to 
being crushed by overbroad legislation" (380). And in 
Qhralik, the Court went even further, warning that the 
commonsense distinctions between commercial and non­
commercial speech might "invite dilution, simply by a lev­
elling process" of the latter (455). Therefore, the Court 
would grant "[c]ommercial speech a limited measure of pro­
tection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the 
scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of 
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of 
non-commercial expression" (455). Thus, the stage was set 
for the Court to retrench and reformulate the commercial 
speech doctrine.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission has been called a case that "expanded the First 
Amendment protection of corporate speech" (Overbeck and 
Pullen 287), perhaps because the Court decided in favor of 
the communication involved. But in the course of deciding 
Central Hudson, the Court undertook an entire restatement 
of the commercial speech doctrine, a restatement which 
explicitly reaffirmed and institutionalized the limits on 
commercial speech freedom begun in the three above- 
mentioned attorney advertising cases. Because of its tre­
mendous importance in articulating current doctrine, Cen­
tral Hudson will be closely examined.
In Central Hudson, the Court declared unconstitutional 
a New York Public Service Commission order banning adver­
tising by electric utilities promoting the use of energy 
as a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Although the Court recognized the state's legitimate 
interest in promoting the conservation of energy, the Pub­
lic Service Commission's order was struck down on the nar­
row ground that the regulation was more extensive than 
necessary, since it might apply equally to energy- 
efficient electric devices as well as those in more common 
use (580-581).
In his majority opinion, Justice Powell articulated a 
four-part test to be used to determine when state regula­
tion of commercial speech was allowable:
[W]e, must determine (1) whether the expression is 
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial 
speech to come within that provision, it must (1A) 
concern lawful activity and (IB) not be misleading. 
Next, we ask (2) whether the asserted governmental 
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield pos­
itive answers, we must determine (3) whether the reg­
ulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted, and (4) whether it is not more extensive 
than necessary to serve that interest. (566)
The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, the one 
used to strike down the Public Service Commission order, 
appears, prima facie. to be a restatement of the over-
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breadth doctrine. But Powell was quick to note that while 
statutes regulating commercial speech must be narrowly 
drawn, "[t]his analysis is not an application of the over­
breadth doctrine" (565 at n. 8).
To understand this apparent contradiction, it is nec­
essary to briefly review the overbreadth doctrine itself, 
and attempt to distinguish between that doctrine and Cen­
tral Hudson's fourth prong. This analysis will also be 
helpful before attempting narrowly-tailored definitions of 
commercial speech itself.
It is an accepted principle of First Amendment law 
that statutes must be neither overbroad nor underinclu- 
sive. In other words, statutes, and the definitions on 
which they rely, must be drawn narrowly enough to avoid 
the risk they might be applied to otherwise protected 
speech, on the theory that such imprecise definitions 
might "chill" broad categories of speech. At the same 
time, they must not be drawn so narrowly that they fail to 
include speech that should be controlled if they are to 
directly advance the state interests which inform them.
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville. (1975), for 
example, the Court overturned a city ordinance prohibiting 
the showing of nudity in drive-ins and on other movie 
screens visible from public streets. The Court held that 
the law was overbroad in that it would "bar a film con­
taining a picture of a baby's buttocks, the nude body of a 
war victim or scenes from a culture where nudity is
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indigenous" (213). Here, the Court was relying on the phi­
losophy expressed in Chaplinsky. where the majority held 
that control of speech is permissible only in "narrowly 
limited classes of speech" (571). The Jacksonville ordi­
nance was unconstitutional also because it was underinclu- 
sive. Part of the rationale behind the law was that nudity 
on drive-in screens was a hazard in that it might distract 
drivers. But the Court majority replied that nudity was 
being singled out and that other movies, such as those 
depicting violence, might be equally distracting, yet were 
permissible under the ordinance (215).
When applying the doctrine of overbreadth, courts are 
generally not obliged to reach the question of whether the 
speech in a given case is itself protected. As a note in
the Harvard Law Review has explained it: "Rather than
excise particular applications one by one as they arise, 
the Court has employed the First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine to short circuit the process by invalidating the
statute and putting it up to the legislature for redraft­
ing. (The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine 845).
The overbreadth doctrine gives litigants the power, as 
the Court noted in Broadrick v. Oklahoma. (1973), to 
"challenge a statute not because their own rights of free 
expression are violated, but because of a judicial predic­
tion or assumption that the statute's very existence may 
cause others not before the court to refrain from consti­
tutionally protected speech or expression" (612).
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If the Court were ever to declare the overbreadth doc­
trine totally applicable in the commercial speech area, it 
might permit an advertiser to challenge a state or federal 
statute, "even where the advertiser's communication in 
question was false or misleading, or related to unlawful 
activity, or was for some other reason unprotected" (Rome 
and Roberts 151).
The distinction between the overbreadth doctrine and 
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, then, is that 
courts must reach the question in commercial speech cases 
of whether or not the specific communication involved is 
constitutionally protected. The Court's refusal to apply 
the overbreadth doctrine in its entirety to the commercial 
speech area, other than to require statutes to be "nar­
rowly drawn," stems from its belief implied in Bates. that 
commercial speech is somehow "hardier" speech than other 
communication deserving constitutional protection.
The Court, in the first prong of the Central Hudson 
test, also reinforced the notion that protected commercial 
speech not be false or misleading, supplying the following 
rationale: "[C]ommercial speakers have extensive knowledge 
both of the market and their products. Thus, they are well 
situated to evaluate the accuracy of their messages and 
the lawfulness of the underlying activity" (564 at n.6).
Far from being an expansion of the rights afforded 
commercial speakers, then, Central Hudson clearly repre­
sents movement away from the expansive tone of Virginia
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Board of Pharmacy. To be sure, the Court in Central Hudson 
recognized Board of Pharmacy/s rejection of paternalism; 
it went even further, stating that "even when advertising 
communicates only an incomplete version of the relevant 
facts, the First Amendment presumes that some accurate 
information is better than no information at all" 562).
But taken as a whole, Central Hudson cannot be viewed as a 
victory for commercial speakers, particularly when its 
progeny are examined.
Following Central Hudson, the Court had occasion to 
again deal with what has been termed "mixed speech" in 
Bolqer v. Younas Drug Products (1983). Here, for the first 
time, the Court articulated criteria for dealing with such 
speech.
The case involved the mailing of unsolicited flyers 
promoting prophylactics and "discussing the desirability 
of prophylactics in general and Youngs7 products in par­
ticular" fBolqer 62). Because the Court ruled against the 
Postal Service, holding that the information involved was 
"relevant to important social issues such as family plan­
ning and the prevention of venereal disease" (69), Bolqer 
might appear to be a victory for commercial speech inter­
ests.
Justice Thurgood Marshall, for the Court, stated that 
taken by themselves, reference to a specific product, or 
proposals to engage in a commercial transaction, or eco­
nomic motivation, would not compel the conclusion that the
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pamphlets involved are commercial speech fBolder 66-67). 
However, the existence of all three characteristics taken 
together meant the communication in question was commer­
cial .
Nonetheless, Marshall went on to say that: 
[Advertising which "links a product to a current 
public debate" is not thereby entitled to the consti­
tutional protection afforded noncommercial speech . .
. A company has the full panoply of protections 
available to its direct comments on public issues, so 
there is no reason for providing similar constitu­
tional protection when such statements are made in 
the context of commercial transactions. (68)
Thus, it would seem that otherwise protected speech 
loses its protected status if it appears in a context the 
Court decides is commercial.
Justice John Paul Stevens, in concurrence, worried 
that Bolder might lead to just this sort of dilution:
[Advertisements may be a complex mixture of commer­
cial and noncommercial elements: the noncommercial 
message does not obviate the need for appropriate 
commercial regulation . . . conversely, the commer­
cial element does not necessarily provide a valid 
basis for noncommercial censorship. . . . 
[Significant speech so often comprises both commer­
cial and noncommercial elements. . . . "  (81-81)
If one adopts the view that recent commercial speech
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decisions have moved away from Board of Pharmacy, the 
Court's most recent major encounter with advertising — Po­
sadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of 
Puerto Rico —  seems more a continuation of this reformu­
lation than it does a dramatic turn-around, as it has been 
viewed by some commentators (e.g. Hoveland and Wilcox).
In Posadas. a 5-4 Court upheld a Puerto Rico regula­
tion that banned advertising of casino gambling on the 
island. The regulation was aimed at discouraging casino 
gambling by citizens of the Commonwealth while allowing 
advertising aimed at tourists. Justice Rehnquist, writing 
shortly before his elevation to chief justice, applied the 
Central Hudson test, and found the statute permissible.
Rehnquist's underlying rationale makes Posadas impor­
tant to any examination of commercial speech involving 
Nevada brothel advertising.
Rehnquist reasoned that gambling was an activity that 
could be completely proscribed by the state: "The greater 
power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily 
includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino 
gambling" (283), Rehnquist wrote. He continued:
It would surely be a Pyrrhic victory for casino own­
ers such as appellant to gain recognition of a First 
Amendment right to advertise their casinos to the 
residents of Puerto Rico, only to thereby force the 
legislature into banning casino gambling by residents 
altogether. It would just as surely be a strange con-
stitutional doctrine which would concede to the leg­
islature the authority to totally ban a product or 
activity, but deny to the legislature the authority
to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product
through advertising on behalf of those who would 
profit from such increased demand. (92 LEd. 2nd 284) 
In his sharply-worded dissent, Justice Brennan replied 
that the "strange constitutional doctrine" Rehnquist 
referred to was known as the First Amendment (289 at n.
4). Rehnquist's position will be addressed more fully in 
Chapter Three when we turn our attention to the divergent 
First Amendment philosophies which underlie the differing 
formulations of the commercial speech doctrine. For now, 
it will suffice to note that Rehnquist's opinion, while
clearly indicating advertising of prostitution in Nevada
could be proscribed by the state, held that editorial com­
ment on the same subject would remain fully protected by 
the First Amendment:
[Advertising restrictions cannot be used to inhibit 
either the freedom of the press in Puerto Rico to 
report on any aspect of casino gambling, or the free­
dom of anyone, including casino owners, to comment 
publicly on such matters as legislation relating to 
casino gambling. (92 LEd. 2d 280 at n. 7)
Posadas. then, reiterates a thread common throughout 
the evolution of commercial speech doctrine —  that while 
commercial expression may be regulated, editorial comment
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on commercial issues remains largely protected. Although 
the level of protection enjoyed by commercial speech has 
fluctuated over time, the notion that this level is dif­
ferent that afforded editorial expression in general or 
advertising in the "public interest" has remained con­
stant.
A definitional problem, then, remains at the core of 
the commercial speech doctrine. Commercial speech must not 
only be truthful and non-misleading, it is also subject to 
government suppression if the expression relates to acti­
vity not itself constitutionally protected. On the other 
hand, a publication's editorial content receives substan­
tially more protection. This editorial content includes 
more than "opinion" articles reflecting a publication's 
position on issues of public interest; by common journal­
istic usage "editorial" refers to all non-commercial con­
tent in a publication.
Attempts to define commercial speech will be the focus 
of Chapter Five. But before examining these attempts, it 
will be helpful to review the philosophical positions that 
have resulted in differing standards of protection for 
different types of speech. It is these philosophical 
assumptions, which underlie First Amendment theory in gen­




The cases discussed in Chapter Two reflect divergent 
visions of the First Amendment —  from the narrow view of 
protected speech articulated in Valentine to the expansive 
philosophy of Virginia Board of Pharmacy to the retrench­
ment of Posadas. These differing positions reflect differ­
ent underlying philosophies as to what values the First 
Amendment is intended to serve. Understanding those dif­
fering interpretations of First Amendment values will be 
helpful in evaluating the various definitions that have 
been proposed for commercial speech, since any definition 
of commercial speech necessarily reflects certain underly­
ing assumptions. This chapter discusses these philosophi­
cal positions, from the view that the First Amendment was 
designed to protect only political speech to the broader 
notion that the amendment serves the larger value of self- 
expression. How these differing views have been applied to 
commercial speech, and how they have resulted in a differ­
ing level of the protection for such expression, will also 
be examined.
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The Meiklejohn Paradigm 
As noted, valentine v. Chrestensen reflects a narrow 
view of what speech ought to be constitutionally pro­
tected. Among modern constitutional scholars, the view 
that the First Amendment was primarily intended to protect 
political speech was first articulated by Alexander Mei­
klejohn. This view of the First Amendment is important 
because, as Professor Martin Redish has observed, "Dr. 
Meiklejohn's articulate exposition of the purposes that 
lie behind the [F]irst [A]mendment has received consider­
able attention, and some adherence, from both commentators 
and the Supreme Court" (434).
In Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government. 
Meiklejohn argued that self-government is the essence of 
the American political system. Meiklejohn concluded from 
this premise that, "The guarantee given by the First 
Amendment is not, then, assured to all speaking. It is 
assured only to speech which bears, directly or indi­
rectly, upon issues with which voters have to deal —  only 
therefore, to the consideration of matters of public 
interest" (94).
It follows from this that the First Amendment is 
designed not to protect the rights of speakers, but to 
ensure the free flow of information which facilitates the 
effective functioning of the political system of self- 
government. In this sense, Meiklejohn foreshadows the 
audience-centered perspective the Supreme Court would
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later use, ironically enough, to expand dramatically the 
First Amendment protection afforded commercial speech: 
that the rights of the listener to receive information 
were entitled to at least as much consideration as the 
rights of speakers.
Meiklejohn drew a clear distinction between "public" 
and "private" speech, arguing that only "public" dis­
course, which he defined as expression relating to the 
performance of self-governance, was protected by the First 
Amendment. "Private" speech, that expression which took 
place outside the political arena, would receive whatever 
consideration to which it was legitimately entitled only 
from the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
This distinction between public and private speech is 
not as clear as it might at first seem. How directly, for 
instance, must speech affect public discourse before it is 
granted the protection of the First Amendment? It was 
reported that when the Court decided Sullivan. Meiklejohn 
declared it was "an occasion for dancing in the streets" 
(Kalven 221). Thus, at least in some cases, Meiklejohn 
allowed that some advertising, normally considered private 
speech, might further political ends and ought to be con­
sidered public.
If advertisements were to be considered public, then 
what of literature, science, and scholarship? At first, 
Meiklejohn suggested these might be relegated to what 
Zechariah Chafee called the "obscure shelter" of the Fifth
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Amendment (Chafee 891). However, responding to the criti­
cisms of Harry Kalven and Chafee, Meiklejohn subsequently 
expanded his theory to allow "that the people do need nov­
els and dramas and paintings and poems 'because they will 
be called upon to vote,'" (The First Amendment 263).
Despite the difficulty in drawing any distinct line 
between protected and unprotected speech, a politically- 
based interpretation of the First Amendment remains 
attractive to at least some scholars. At the extreme end 
of this tradition was Judge Robert Bork, whose position is 
that First Amendment "protection should be accorded only 
to speech that is explicitly political" (Bork 20). Richard 
Barnes pointed out that this would exclude not only com­
mercial speech, but science, literature and scholarship as 
well (459).
Specifically addressing the issue of commercial speech 
from the Meiklejohn perspective were Thomas H. Jackson and 
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. These scholars took a somewhat 
broader view than Bork, holding that political speech 
"need not be limited to debate of government policy," but 
may also "encompass a wider exchange of ideas and informa­
tion antecedent to the formation of political opinion" 
(10). Jackson and Jeffries would also protect certain eco­
nomic speech, at least as it related to government policy: 
For example, information concerning the degree of 
concentration in a particular industry and the costs 
and benefits of reducing (or increasing) that concen-
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tration may be considered relevant for informed deci­
sion-making on antitrust policy, even if that infor­
mation is not acquired in the course of a debate over 
governmental action. (10)
Presumably, too, debate on the legalization of prosti­
tution and the public health concerns raised by the legal 
status of brothels might be included in Jackson and Jef­
fries' scheme of constitutional protection.
Like Meiklejohn, however, Jackson and Jeffries argued 
that whatever protection is to be afforded private speech, 
if any, must come from the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. Thus, commercial speech, at least that which 
does no more than propose an economic transaction, should 
receive no constitutional protection. The authors argued 
that the Virginia Board of Pharmacy case was wrongly 
decided, since it resurrects the discredited constitu­
tional notion of economic due process under the guise of 
the First Amendment. They pointed out that in Carolene 
Products. the Court struck down the holding in Lochner v. 
New York that economic liberty was a constitutionally 
protected right. Since Carolene Products, economic regula­
tion has been considered a legislative, not a judicial 
matter. Redefining the constitutional question as one of 
free speech is inappropriate and does not mandate judicial 
interference with legislative authority, according to 
Jackson and Jeffries.
Jackson and Jeffries advanced the argument —  later
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relied upon by Rehnquist in his majority Posadas opinion 
—  that the greater power to regulate economic activity 
includes the lesser power to regulate commercial advertis­
ing. They argued that the Court's holding in Virginia 
Board of Pharmacy makes sense only if one assumes a First 
Amendment value to advertising independent of its role in 
facilitating the sale of a given commodity. "That no such 
independent purpose in fact can be identified confirms the 
hypothesis that the significance of ordinary business 
advertising lies in its relation to the contemplated eco­
nomic transaction" (Jackson and Jeffries 36).
Finally, Jackson and Jeffries criticized the notion, 
expressed by the Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, that 
the failure to expand the protection of commercial speech 
will result in definitional difficulties. Indeed, the 
authors claimed, a reliable way to distinguish between 
commercial and non-commercial speech is not necessary for 
two reasons.
First, the Court's concern that advertisers would 
attempt to evade legislative restraint by clothing their 
advertisements in political commentary is, they argued, 
"belied by experience" (22). They noted that the record in 
the Virginia Board of Phar- macy case contains no evidence 
of such subterfuge; nor did the only such instance dealt 
with by the Court, Valentine v. Chrestensen. seem to 
present any definitional difficulty for the justices. Sec­
ond, since the primary purpose of advertising is to make
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money, the fact that "politicized" advertisements would 
likely be less effective would serve as an economic con­
straint against such attempts at subterfuge. As the 
authors stated: "Economic self-interest would often coun­
sel against any elaborate ruse to convey a forbidden com­
mercial message" (24).
However, Jackson and Jeffries' arguments remain uncon­
vincing. The existence of Nevada brothel messages belies 
the authors' argument that the Court is engaging in pure 
speculation rather than with realistic concerns. So does 
Valentine v. Chrestensen. despite both the Court's and the 
authors' cavalier dismissal of the case's explicit defini­
tional problem. That the Court created a definition for 
commercial speech in Valentine —  "purely commercial 
advertising" —  and then seemed to disregard this defini­
tion in its holding, underlines the unresolved nature of 
the problem.
Neither can much weight be given Jackson and Jeffries' 
argument that economic self-interest would preclude 
attempts at subterfuge. Here, the authors viewed advertis­
ing only in the most simplistic terms. Modern advertising 
is not limited to, or indeed even largely composed of 
simple announcements of price and availability. The very 
existence of issue and institutional corporate advertis­
ing, press releases and other forms of business communica­
tion argue against the notion that "subterfuge" is econom­
ically unfeasible. Nor does the authors' argument consider
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that such subterfuge may be the only way for an advertiser 
to get his message into the marketplace. Such is certainly 
the case with Nevada brothel messages, since any form of 
such advertising is banned in Clark and Washoe counties, 
the chief sources of customers for the rural houses of 
prostitution. Should other business interests, tobacco or 
alcohol producers for example, find themselves similarly 
prohibited from advertising, it is not unreasonable to 
suppose they might resort to such measures on a national 
level.
In addition, there may be motivations other than "sub­
terfuge" involved. Who is to say that Youngs Drug Company 
is not genuinely interested in birth control or public 
health and honestly wishes to educate the public on such 
matters? Who knows for certain that brothel owners are not 
genuinely concerned about AIDS as a public health issue? 
Finally, the lack of a plethora of actual cases reaching 
the Supreme Court which require a distinction be made 
between commercial and non-commercial speech does not 
obviate the need for such a definition. Jackson and Jef­
fries cited Bork, who noted that "The existence of close 
cases is not a reason to refuse to draw a line and so deny 
majorities the power to govern in areas where their power 
is legitimate" (Bork 28). Nor should refusal to draw 
needed lines deny the judiciary the power to adjudicate. 
The authors also pointed to Rehnquist's dissent in Virgi­
nia Board of Pharmacy, where the justice argued that it is
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one thing to speculate about some future case that may 
require subtle distinctions and quite another to use this 
rationale to displace legislative authority (Jackson and 
Jeffries 19). Justice Rehnquist also noted in that dissent 
that:
There are undoubted difficulties with an effort to 
draw a bright line between "commercial speech" on the 
one hand and "protected speech" on the other, and the 
Court does better to face up to these difficulties 
than to attempt to hide them under labels. (787)
It can certainly be argued that a search for defini­
tions of categories of speech better faces up to defini­
tional difficulties than does hiding them under the label 
of judicial restraint. While it is certainly an accepted 
principle of appropriate judicial restraint that courts 
avoid sweeping constitutional pronouncements where pos­
sible, it is also the judiciary's mandate to answer such 
questions when necessary.
Jackson and Jeffries noted that Virginia Board of 
Pharmacy would have been decided correctly "[h]ad the case 
involved political commentary or the publication of news­
worthy information" (16). But if this is true —  and 
indeed it seems an accepted principle of commercial speech 
case law that it is —  then one cannot avoid facing the 
definitional issues of just what constitutes political 
commentary or newsworthy information as opposed to some 
yet ill-defined category of "commercial speech," Jackson
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and Jeffries' claims to the contrary notwithstanding.
The Self Expression Paradigm
Although he reached much the same conclusion as Jack­
son and Jeffries —  that commercial speech should be out­
side the protection of the First Amendment —  Professor C. 
Edwin Baker viewed the issue from a very different per­
spective. To Baker, self expression, rather than political 
expediency was the central value served by the First 
Amendment. He summarized his theory of the amendment suc­
cinctly: "As long as speech represents the freely chosen 
expression of the listener while depending for its power 
on the free acceptance of the speaker, freedom of speech 
represents a charter of liberty for non-coercive action" 
(7). For Baker, the First Amendment was designed to allow 
free individuals to develop their own visions of a good 
life.
Commercial speech, for Baker, could never be equated 
with self expression, since it is motivated by a desire 
for profit, rather than expressing the values of the 
speaker. Baker argued that a whiskey company, for 
instance, would promote whiskey regardless of the personal 
feelings of its managers, employees or stockholders (18). 
Although Baker admitted the press is motivated by profit, 
he distinguishes the media from other businesses on the 
ground that media are protected by the press clause of the 
First Amendment. Baker seemed satisfied with a traditional
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notion of the press, and would not expand the definition 
of press to include corporate-sponsored image advertising, 
even when explicitly political.
Baker's anti-capitalist perspective had also to dis­
tinguish economically-motivated speech on the part of 
labor unions, which he favored, from that of corporations, 
which he opposed. He did so by arguing, perhaps unconvin­
cingly, that the market did not determine the speech of 
labor unions (37).
The key to understanding Baker is that one must real­
ize that his First Amendment theory is what one commenta­
tor has termed "an alternative to marketplace theory" 
(Shiffrin 1243). Baker rejected the "marketplace of ideas" 
metaphor articulated by John Stuart Mill and implicit in 
the audience-centered perspective of Bork and Jackson and 
Jeffries, arguing that the marketplace disproportionately 
represents the status quo on important issues. Instead, 
Baker advanced a uniquely source-focused theory of the 
First Amendment, based upon self fulfillment through self 
expression without coercion. This, for Baker, became a 
constitutional principle not to be balanced away in favor 
of other societal interests. Indeed, Baker was generally 
critical of balancing and in favor of judicial "prin­
ciples," arguing that the weighing of competing interests 
led to inconsistent results and offered little protection 
to fundamental liberties.
In addition to the problems with motivation already
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discussed in regards to Jackson and Jeffries, Baker's 
theory is open to other criticisms. As Professor Steven 
Shiffrin has noted:
If [Baker} is correct that people's perspectives "are 
greatly influenced, if not determined” by their loca­
tion in a specific socio-economic structure, then it 
becomes difficult to understand why individual speech 
reflects free choice any more than does corporate 
speech. (1246)
One can also observe, as did Shiffrin, that Baker's 
scholarship "is a piece of advocacy designed to promote 
change” (1248). As such, although he provided at least one 
way of looking at commercial speech, Baker must be 
approached circumspectly.
Of more value, perhaps, is the theory of Professor 
Martin Redish. Redish, too, focused on the value of self 
expression, but arrived at the opposite conclusion from 
Baker in regards to commercial speech. For Baker, the 
First Amendment protected the union picketer, but not the 
businessman. Redish, on the other hand, posed the follow­
ing analogy: ”[I]f the constitutional guarantee of free 
speech permits a picket to stand in front of a business 
establishment to urge patrons not to enter, then by the 
same reasoning a merchant could stand in the doorway of 
his establishment and solicit customers" (430).
For Redish, the matter also went beyond simple social 
equity. Focusing on the receiver of advertising messages
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rather than the source, Redish was able to discern impor­
tant First Amendment values which were served by commer­
cial speech:
It has long been recognized that one function of gov­
ernment is to promote the general welfare —  to 
assist the citizenry in achieving a materially satis­
factory life. It is also generally recognized that 
advertising, at least in theory, may serve a vital 
role in aiding an individual's attainment of that 
goal. (432)
Redish admitted that much actual advertising did not 
fulfill this informational function, but argued that this 
did not lessen the level of constitutional protection to 
which all advertising should be entitled.
In an argument similar to that later put forth by the 
Court majority in Virginia Board of Pharmacy. Redish 
argued that commercial decisions were often more important 
to the individual than political ones. Commercial speech 
was seen as similar to political speech, but on a smaller 
scale. Redish argued that if society held political self- 
government to be important, then by the same reasoning, 
"private self-government" in the economic marketplace 
should similarly be nurtured by protecting commercial 
speech (442). Perhaps the most important First Amendment 
function of commercial speech for Redish was its role in 
allowing the individual to achieve "the maturation of his 
rational capabilities" (441). Commercial speech, particu­
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larly price advertising, facilitates rational decision­
making in the marketplace, encouraging consumers to weigh 
price and other product information before making personal 
economic decisions. Such behavior allows the consumer to 
"exercise his abilities to reason and think; this aids him 
towards the intangible goal of rational self-fulfillment" 
(444). Although it is true that advertisements might not 
provide mental exercise to the extent of that provided by 
literature and at least some forms of political debate, 
Redish reminded his reader that the Supreme Court has seen 
fit to grant substantial First Amendment protection to 
other forms of communication, including much political 
speech, far below this rarified standard (444).
Redish called the task of distinguishing commercial 
from non-commercial speech an "onerous" one, avoidance of 
which could threaten otherwise protected expression (431). 
But in the final analysis, Redish's theory would eliminate 
the need for defining commercial speech, since such speech 
would be elevated to the level of protected political com­
munication. Certainly, the very act of defining commercial 
speech implies that it is entitled to a different, if not 
lesser, level of protection than that afforded other cate­
gories of speech.
Rationalizing the Regulation 
of Commercial Speech 
By defining commercial speech, we distinguish commer-
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cial speech from other communication in terms of what 
makes it unique. The Court has already implicitly done so. 
However, the traditional rationales for regulating commer- 
speech —  that such speech is inherently hardier and more 
easily verifiable than other forms of communication —  are 
easily dismissed.
As already noted, in denying certiorari in National 
Commission on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, the Supreme Court 
itself observed that in some areas, commercial information 
is actually less subject to verification than other cate­
gories of speech. Certainly the nutritional aspects of 
some foods would be one such area. Others might include 
the health benefits of certain substances, or even the 
economic ramifications of governmental action or of indi­
vidual purchasing behavior. For instance, is the state­
ment "Buy American —  help reduce the trade deficit" 
empirically verifiable or not? In any event, commercial 
speech as a class seems no more verifiable than political 
speech —  indeed, in many cases it would seem less so. As 
Farber has observed: "A political candidate knows the 
truth about his own past and his present intentions, yet 
misrepresentations on these subjects are immune from state 
regulation" (386).
Nor does commercial speech, as a class, seem any hard­
ier than other types of speech. First, it is dangerous to 
allow the motivation of economic self-interest to serve as 
a basis for the level of protection afforded a given cate­
gory of communication. Extending such a rationale could 
threaten economically motivated communication on the part 
of newspapers, office seekers, and others whose speech 
rightfully enjoys strong constitutional safeguards. The 
argument that commercial speech is somehow hardier also 
seems to assume that advertising is usually done by large 
corporations with considerable resources available with 
which to disseminate their economic messages. But even a 
cursory examination of Supreme Court commercial speech 
case law belies this supposition. On the contrary, reli­
gious groups, civil rights advocates, and abortion coun­
seling centers have all relied on advertising to communi­
cate to mass publics. Such speech seems no more hardy, nor 
less important, than much that is fully protected under 
the First Amendment.
Still, reasons for allowing some form of regulation of 
commercial speech remain. First, even if commercial speech 
is not more intrinsically verifiable than other forms of 
speech, there are often aspects of such speech that are 
similar to contracts. Farber has noted that "the constitu­
tional status of an advertisement describing a product may 
be unclear, but a seller is obviously liable for damages 
for failure to deliver a product corresponding to the con­
tract description" (387). Although the existence of an 
implied contract does not seem by itself to warrant prior 
restraint of commercial speech, it does lend weight to 
governmental claims regarding the need to regulate
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patently false or deceptive speech.
Such claims appear even more legitimate when one con­
siders that while it is today an accepted constitutional 
principle that "[t]he First Amendment requires that we 
protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that 
matters" (Gertz 341), such protection is limited to pub­
lic, rather than private matters, in defamation law. The 
Court in Gertz decided that falsehood might sometimes need 
to be protected in cases of clear public interest, but 
many commercial speech cases deal only with private eco­
nomic choices.
Finally, while a standard of absolute protection for 
commercial speech might seem theoretically appealing, 
since it would allow for easy resolution of many difficult 
issues, such a standard would be unrealistic. A majority 
of the Court has never endorsed an absolutist interpreta­
tion of the First Amendment generally; it is highly 
unlikely it would do so in commercial speech cases. At the 
same time, commercial speech intuitively seems different 
from other forms of speech, and as such might deserve a 
different standard of protection. Attempting to articulate 
those differences, and fashioning from them a workable 
definition of commercial speech that satisfies adherents 
of both the Meiklejohn and self-expression paradigms is a 




BROTHEL MESSAGES IN NEVADA
Distinguishing commercial from noncommercial speech 
became an issue in Nevada soon after the constitutionality 
of banning brothel advertisements in Clark and Washoe 
counties (NRS 201.430) was upheld by the Nevada Supreme 
Court in 1982, three years following the law's enactment. 
The court's decision in Princess,. Sea Industries v. Nevada. 
has been criticized as "an opinion filled with righteous­
ness" (Simon 234). This chapter discusses the shortcomings 
of the Princess Sea decision before moving on to the 
changes that case engendered in the dissemination of 
brothel messages.
The case went to the Nevada Supreme Court when attor­
neys for brothel owner Walter Plankinton and two adult- 
oriented publications, Las Vegas Panorama and Las Vegas 
Mirror. argued the law violated their client's First 
Amendment rights to free expression. Citing U.S. Supreme 
Court case law on commercial speech, the appellants argued 
that since brothel prostitution was a lawful activity, 
advertising of that activity could not be curtailed.
Deputy Attorney General Joshua Landish, who, with
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Edwards, argued the case before the court, admitted that: 
It is beyond dispute that after the Supreme Court's 
rulings in B.i.gelQW . . . Virginia Pharmacy Board . . 
. and Bates, that paid commercial advertisements are 
not stripped of First Amendment protection merely 
because they appear in that form. (Landish 29)
But Landish went on to argue that:
[I]n concluding that commercial speech may be 
afforded a degree of First Amendment protection, the 
Court stressed its
holding did not mean that commercial advertising 
could never be regulated in any way. On the contrary, 
the Court specifically recognized that some forms of 
commercial speech regulations were surely permissible 
(96 S. Ct. at 1817). The Court noted: ". . . there is 
no claim that the transaction proposed in the forbid­
den advertisements are themselves (sic) illegal in 
any way.” (34)
Anticipating Rehnquist in Posadas. Landish reasoned 
that since brothel prostitution was illegal in Clark 
County and the state was entitled to regulate prostitution 
in all its jurisdictions, it could certainly regulate the 
advertising of brothel prostitution (Record on Appeal 39).
Nonetheless, the Nevada Supreme Court avoided the 
First Amendment issues involved and relied simply on a 
"presumption of constitutionality” in Justice John Mow­
bray's majority opinion, arguing that "the legislative
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enactment in question does not clearly contravene consti­
tutional principles as thus far articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court" (Princess Sea 283).
Mowbray's analysis is unsatisfactory. United States v. 
Carolene Products clearly limits the application of the 
presumption of constitutionality to laws of economic regu­
lation, and not to potential abridgements of the First 
Amendment rights of either speakers or listeners. Indeed, 
cases involving questions of fundamental liberties require 
courts to apply strict scrutiny, and laws which appear to 
abridge such rights are to be presumed unconstitutional.
More satisfactory, from a constitutional doctrine 
point of view, is Justice Noel Manoukian's concurring 
opinion in Princess Sea. "I believe that those in the 
majority fail to sufficiently address the important First 
Amendment issue of this appeal,” Manoukian wrote. "In 
light of the many recent United States Supreme Court hold­
ings bearing on this vital question, it is incumbent on 
this Court to re-examine and fully discuss the First 
Amendment when it is dispositive of the case at hand." 
(283)
Manoukian relied on an argument Landish used in his 
"Points and Authorities,” filed with the Nevada Supreme 
Court June 28, 1979. Although commercial speech is 
entitled to some measure of constitutional protection, 
Landish argued the level of such protection is less than 
that afforded purely political speech. Manoukian agreed,
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noting:
To require parity of constitutional protection for 
commercial speech and noncommercial speech could 
invite dilution, simply by a levelling process, of 
the force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect 
to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the 
First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead 
have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of 
protection, commensurate with its subordinate posi­
tion in the scale of First Amendment values" (Prin­
cess Sea 285).
Manoukian, citing Ohralik. correctly pointed out that 
the Court explicitly endorsed a lower level of judicial 
scrutiny in commercial speech cases (Princess Sea 285). He 
concluded that "the advertisement of prostitution does not 
pertain to fundamental constitutional interests as does 
the advertisement of abortion" (285). Rather, the justice 
concluded, "The speech at hand is due little, if any pro­
tection. It involves entertainment, not information or 
ideas" (Princess Sea 287).
Still, attorneys for Plankinton and the publications 
argued that brothel advertising dealt with an issue in the 
public interest. Their arguments underline the difficulty 
of defining what sorts of otherwise commercial speech 
might be protected because they deal with issues of either 
import or notoriety:
[T]he advertisements lay bare and open avenues of
discussion and debate on the legalized, medically 
controlled practice of one of the "oldest of profes­
sions", obviously polarizing the American public as 
diametrically as the hitherto well-litigated areas of 
capital punishment, abortion, dissemination of birth 
control products and information and the personal 
viewing of obscene motion pictures in the home. 
Whether prostitution should be legalized in licensed 
medically controlled brothels has long been a subject 
of debate in many areas. That Nevada permits such an 
activity in certain of its counties has greatly 
advanced such debate and provided a viable forum and 
actual basis to foster such discussions and debates. 
Petitioners (sic) advertisement advances such mean­
ingful discussion and debate, for clearly anyone 
responding to such an advertisement and becoming a 
patron thus becomes an informed voice in the Freedom 
of Speech on this almost ageless subject. (Hanson and 
Smith 20)
Still, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case 
and denied petitioners certiorari in 1981. Although both 
courts rejected advertisements as an avenue for debate and 
discussion on prostitution, it soon became apparent adver­
tisements weren't the only "viable forum" available to 
those interested in disseminating brothel information.
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Comment or Advertisement?
As commercial speech, of course, brothel messages 
would clearly be proscribable under Posadas. But, as noted 
in Chapter One, even Rehnquist approvingly cites Pitts­
burgh Press in support of the idea that editorial expres­
sion is always due full First Amendment protection. The 
line between the two remains far from distinct.
The July 6, 1979 issue of the Las Vegas Mirror, was 
published the same week NRS 201.430 took effect. The Mir­
ror. a tourist-oriented publication, contained entertain­
ment and gaming articles and was supported by advertise­
ments for resort hotels, car rental agencies and other 
businesses with a large visitor trade. Prior to July 1979, 
the Mirror also ran advertisements for a variety of adult- 
oriented businesses, including brothels. But the July 6 
issue carried no brothel advertisements; instead, the Mir­
ror carried an article entitled "Gone But Not Forgotten."
The article was a sentimental history of the role of 
brothels in the old West, as well as a discussion of the 
current legal difficulties facing brothel advertisers. 
Frontier prostitutes were described as "Sisters of Mercy" 
who tended to the needs of lonely pioneers.
The article then discussed NRS 201.430. Clark County 
District Attorney Bob Miller and Edward Bernstein, an 
attorney for Princess Sea Industries, were quoted discuss­
ing each side of the Princess Sea case.
Accompanying the article was a brothel advertisement
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labeled "example.11 (See Figure One.) Clearly visible on 
the advertisement were a map detailing how to reach Las 
Vegas's "closest and finest brothel, the World Famous 
Chicken Ranch," telephone numbers to the brothel and a 
limousine service, and descriptions of services offered at 
the brothel. These services were said to include the 
"largest selection of girls," "outcall services" and "dom­
inant females for passive males." Also appearing on the 
advertisement was a caricature of two policemen holding a 
sign reading, "censored" between them. A comparison of 
this "example" with a similar advertisement in the Mirror 
run before the passage of NRS 201.430 indicates the "cen­
sored" sign covers only the words "and still growing 
strong" and "courtesy gas available to our customers."
Such brothel messages have been continuously distrib­
uted in Las Vegas, without reference to NRS 201.430, since 
1979, according to Deputy District Attorney Edwards. 
Edwards said the constitutional status of the messages is 
too unclear to warrant prosecution. Despite complaints 
from some Las Vegas citizens concerning the sexual nature 
of the materials, efforts to remove the vending racks 
containing the magazine were discontinued, he said, when 
it was decided by his office that such measures would have 
to apply equally to all publications distributed in such a 
manner —  whether they contained brothel messages or not.
For the purposes of this study, flyers containing 
brothel messages were obtained from newsracks on Las Vegas
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Boulevard and on Fremont Street between Fall 1987 and 
Summer 1988. One 16-page flyer, entitled Fantasy To Remem- 
feSC is typical of these materials. Fantasy to Remember is 
made up almost entirely of pages labeled "paid advertise­
ment," which tell of "nude show-dancers" who offer to per­
form in a customer's hotel room.
Only one page of the publication contains more than a 
few words of copy, the publication being dominated by sug­
gestive pictures of scantily-clad women. Labelled "edito­
rial," the page is headlined "Positively the Closest 
Brothel to Las Vegas." (See Figure Two.) It displays tele­
phone numbers for the Chicken Ranch and for free air or 
limousine transportation service, a map showing how to 
reach the brothel, and a description of the facilities. In 
addition to a bar, a jukebox, and "eight-person jacuzzis 
offering private and group relaxation and enjoyment," the 
Chicken Ranch offers facilities to accommodate the physi­
cally handicapped, including widened doors and wheelchair 
ramps.
The "Ladies of the Chicken Ranch" are also described. 
(This part of the editorial could not be reproduced due to 
production limitations.) Their ages (18-37) and outside 
interests (nursing, teaching, real estate, farming, 
finance and physical fitness) are discussed. "One of the 
ladies speaks five languages and is still learning," the 
editorial notes. The writer of the editorial also stated 
that the prostitutes are involved in charitable activities
PLEASE NOTE:
Copyrighted m aterials in this docum ent have 
not been  filmed at the re q u est of th e  author. 
They are available for consultation , however, 
in the au th o rs  university library.
T hese  consist of p ag es:
6 5 (Figure 2: Fantasy to Remember)
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in their spare time: "[T]heir support of the local Pahrump 
senior citizens' fund-raisers indicates their caring sup­
port of their home away from home."
Judging from the use of the word "editorial," it would 
seem the publishers of the flyers are using it in the 
sense touched upon in Chapter Three —  to refer to any 
non-advertising content. Such content could, of course, 
go beyond discussion of political issues or other matters 
in the public interest. In this sense, the term "edito­
rial" might be properly applied to any expression pro­
tected by the First Amendment, including entertainment, 
literature and, artwork.
A second 16-page flyer, titled Singles Expose, also 
contains a single "editorial" page, headlined, "Legal 
Whorehouses... Only 45 minutes from Vegas but, oh, what a 
difference it makes!" (See Figure Three). This editorial 
emphasizes the safety of Nevada brothels from a public 
health perspective. It states that the girls are inspected 
weekly by a physician and that "health problems are virtu­
ally non-existent." It also warns that prostitution is 
illegal in Clark County and that "you have no protection 
against encountering an unhappy experience if you pick up 
a street walker."
The "editorial" goes on to describe the facilities at 
the Cherry Patch and at Mabel's and includes a map. "For 
information purposes, we are printing a map of the area, 
displaying the location of Mabel's and other significant
67
Legal Whorehouses...Only 45 
minutes from Vegas but, oh, 
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tourist attractions," the article states. These other 
attractions include the towns of Mercury, Pahrump, Ash 
Meadows, and the Cherry Patch brothel.
The "Wild West" theme seen in the Mirror "editorial" 
discussed above is further evolved in an article appearing 
in the Sept. 11 1987 issue of Las Vegas After Dark. (See 
Figure Four.) Unlike the flyers described above, Las Vegas 
After Dark is a more traditional editorial forum with 
entertainment features, show reviews, and an opinion piece 
entitled "Abort Bork," in which readers are urged to 
oppose the nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court of the 
former appellate court judge. The brothel story, head­
lined, "The Brothels of Nevada; In the Spirit of the Old 
West...Only 45 minutes from Vegas, but oh, what a differ­
ence it makes! (16)" focuses on the social role brothels 
have historically played;
Much has been told over the years about the Winning 
of the West. About those courageous pioneers who 
blazed new trails into the wilderness, taming that 
virgin land and making it their own.
These brave men needed uncomplicated outlets for 
their pent-up passions. Equally courageous and adven­
turous women soon followed, and the first brothels in 
the west opened, flourished and grew.
The feature points out that prostitutes are inspected 
by a health officer monthly —  "That is why the US Dept of 
Health recommends the legal brothels of Nevada in these
tiSlli S ll l l l l  j i l l  J l l l l l
flilfllliiilljSliail
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Fig- 4. Las Vegas After Dark. Sept. 11, 1987
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uncertain times" —  and concludes:
History tells us that the healthiest societies are 
those which enable people to satisfy their basic 
needs with the least amount of difficulty and risk 
and be free the rest of the time to work toward the 
betterment of humanity. The American West was won by 
pioneering individuals who believed in hard work and 
equally hard play. So enjoy yourself in Las Vegas 
and, if you want to play away from the tables, drive 
a few miles north and do it the safer way.
A second issue of Las Vegas After Dark, dated Nov. 27 
- Dec. 3, 1987, elaborates on the public safety and health 
issue. The front cover of the magazine announces: "Broth­
els Safest Says AIDS Chief Page 16." (See Figure Five.) In 
the page 16 editorial, Clark County health official Rick 
Reich is quoted as saying legal Nevada brothels are "espe­
cially safe," in light of the fact that no case of AIDS 
has ever surfaced in a licensed house of prostitution. The 
editorial contrasts "safe" legal houses of prostitution, 
where customers must wear condoms, to prostitution on the 
streets, "where there is no way to know whether or not 
such a prostitute is infected." (See Figure Six.) On page 
17, facing the editorial, is an advertisement for "Free 
Tourist Information," including information about brothels 
close to Las Vegas. (See Figure Seven.) On the two pages 
before the editorial is an article similar in appearance 
to the one appearing in the Sept. 11 issue of Las Vegas
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Fig. 5. Las Veaas After Dark. Nov. 27, 1987.
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Brothels Offer 
Safer Sex
Legal brothels are the safest places these days for a man to have a sexual 
experience, outside of the bonds of marriage. That's the word from state and 
county health officials.
In fact, according to Clark County Health Districk AIDS Services Coordinator 
Rick Reich, not a single woman working in a legal brothel, either in Nevada 
or in Calgary, Canada (the other location in North America where brothels are 
allowed), has ever tested positive for the AIDS virus.
For the past year and a half, the State of Nevada has required that every 
applicant for a position with a legal brothel be tested for the virus prior to be­
ing licensed to work. During that time, six women taking the test turned up 
positive, meaning they had been exposed at some dine to the vims. That doesn't 
necessarily mean these women had AIDS or were carrying it, but they were sdll 
excluded from working at a Nevada brothel.
Reich adds that because all brothel employees are required to be tested every 
two weeks during their employment, he now has statistics confirming that 
brothels are no place to find this dread disease. Not one brothel worker has 
“ sero-converted,”  meaning that no one who tested aegadve prior to going to 
work at a brothel has subsequendy tested positive.
“The fact that legal brothels now require all clients to use condoms makes 
them especially safe from the threat of AIDS and all other sexually transmitted 
diseases,”  says Reich.
By contrast, streetwalker protltutes are not monitored In any way and there 
is no way for a potential customer to know whether or not such a prostitute 
may be infected.
In a time of anxiety, that’s good news to everyone in this area, resident or 
visitor.
By the way, Reich also states that there are no reported cases of AIDS or 
even positive blood testing for AIDS even from prostitutes working legally in 
Western Europe. As anyone who has ever visited Aauterdam, Hamburg or a 
number of other European cities knows, there are districts within each of these 
municipalities where prostitution is legal.
Working women are inspected regularly by health officials and pay normal 
taxea on their wages. They also receive health insaraace and retirement benefits.
It’s good that parts of Nevada and of Calgary permit the operation of legal 
brothels. Wouldn't it be better, from both a medical and societal standpoint,
if s m B suctions of New York, Chicago, Los Angdes and other American cities 
were nansd for this activity?
O tiaM i not triaklsg to participate or to witness such goings-on would know 
where not to go, and the rest of their cities — as in Europe — would be kept 
free from any form of prostitution.
If someone wants to gamble legally in the United States, he or she knows 
where to go; the state of Nevada or Atlantic City, New Jersey. Gambling is 
a bask hnataa urge, as, of course, is sex.
Neither Is likely to disappear as long as hnmanlty survives. How much better 
to provide appropriate, regulated places for them than to force individuals to 
break the law and risk personal dangers in order to satisfy their bask needs.
Until other parts of oar great country become more enHghtmrd in these areas, 
we can at least be thankful for the legal casinos — and the brothels — we do 
have.
Laa Vagaa AFTER DARK, Nov. 27-Dee. 3, 1987
'Tasty Tidbits'
•From page 3
recalls about her private bank account 
in those days and. when tha t was gone, 
she would tell his secretary and another 
deposit would be made.
She would customarily do her shop­
ping at Londons posh H arrod’s depart­
ment store and the same secretary would 
be sent the bill. Now, she has to pay her 
own bills and  doesn 't like it one bit.
So you think bigtime TV execs have 
it made! CBS Entertainment last week 
axed three VPs from its payroll, along 
with 32 other workers.
Included in the firings were VPs Nan­
cy Bien, Bob Silberling and Peter 
Frankovich. Lesser firees all came from 
the dept, o f  telepix (TV movies) and 
miniseries.
This is the latest bloodletting in CBS’ 
effort to  get rid o f  its red ink. Earlier 
this year, the fam ed CBS News Dept, 
was severely pruned, prompting anchor­
m an Dan Rather to say the word 
“ C ourage”  a t the end o f  one o f his 
newscasts, in an  attem pt to com fort his 
colleagues.
Vegas movie producer Ray Sleekier, 
whose past epics include “Blood Shack” 
and “The Vegas Slasher,” hosted a par­
ty a couple of weekends ago in the Sands 
Hotel room of some of his prospective 
new investors.
A m ong th o se  p re sen t fo r  the 
festivities were Palom ino Club strip 
tease artist Christi Cambell (see photo), 
actress Adrienne G arcia (who was 
featured here some weeks ago after she 
revealed how she has been proposition­
ed on the “ Las Vegas Casting Couch"), 
Channel 13 reporter Sandy Beal and his 
astrologer-friend, Celia.
The investors, from  Canada, were be­
ing wooed by Steckier in hopes they 
would back another o f his features, 
which are now shot directly for video. 
But, the investors, still suffering from 
the Oct. crash o f  world stock m arkets, 
have not yet come through with the re­
quired dough. ____________________
la s  Vegas Publishers, Inc. 
dba
CASINO NCUJS
Now In Its llth  VearServlog Th« 
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After Dark. (See Figure Eight.)
In 1988, with AIDS an ongoing concern, brothel mes­
sages continue to focus on public health. An 8-page flyer 
titled "Showgirls and Showdancers,l! containing many of the 
same advertisements seen in Singles Expose and Fantasy to 
Remember. features an "editorial" entitled "Safe Sex What 
Everyone Should Know." (See Figure Nine.) The editorial 
claims that with the advent of public concern over AIDS, 
Nevada brothels have been declared "100 percent safe" by 
state health officials. A picture of a hot tub, a limou­
sine and a seductively-smiling woman adorn the "edito­
rial," which prints a single phone number to call for fur­
ther information or free transportation to Sheri's Ranch.
When addressing public health issues, these "editori­
als" contain much information which is either false or 
misleading. It seems highly unlikely that public officials 
would have ever "recommended" brothels or called them "100 
percent safe," nor are these claims ever documented. If 
false, such statements might run afoul of the Federal 
Trade Commission, and would certainly put them outside the 
protection of the First Amendment when considered as com­
mercial speech. But if one considers the statements edito­
rial opinion —  ideas rather than facts —  they might well 
be within the law. As previously noted, the First Amend­
ment does not recognize the existence of a false idea 
(Sertz 339).
Therefore, in addition to Simon's concern that lack of
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If you are a local or visitor to 
Las Vegas and are looking 
for a safe sexual encounter, 
Nevada’s legalized brothels 
are the answer.
With the advent of the AIDS scare. Nevada brothels have been 
declared 100% safe by the Nevada Health Dept. Sheri’s Ranch in 
Pahrump Nevada has 
been known for its 
dedication to providing 
the clean luxurious and 
courteous service, 
which earned it and it 
alone a six star rating 
in the book “Brothels 
of Nevada.”
Sheri’s Ranch being 
the oldest name in 
So. Nevada brothels 
has carried on with its 
tradition of over 25 years 
providing clean safe sex to its customers.
All girls in the ranches have regular weekly health inspections by a 
Certified Doctor. Sheri’s Ranch being absolutely the closest brothel to Las 
Vegas provides free limousine service to and from Sheri’s Ranch.
So for the time of your life at a down-to-earth price & freedom from 
disease visit Sheri s Ranch.





. 9. "Safe Sex —  What Everyone Should Know."
commercial speech definitions might dilute the protec­
tion offered core speech, there is also the danger that 
imprecision could lead to the protection of speech which 
might be legitimately controlled. The question, then, is 
not only one of choosing between control or freedom, as 
proponents of commercial speech rights sometimes suggest. 
The question is one of separating that speech which it is 
in society's legitimate interest to control from that 




The messages with which the Nevada judiciary dealt in 
Princess Sea Industries were treated by both sides as 
advertisements, and definitional issues were not raised at 
any level of that case. Justice Mowbray cited U.S. Supreme 
Court case law recognizing a "'commonsense distinction 
between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which 
occurs in an area traditionally subject to government reg­
ulation, and other varieties of speech'" fohralik 
455-456) .
The U.S. Supreme Court has tended to evaluate commer­
cial speech cases in terms of two "commonsense" defini­
tional components: message and content. A third component, 
the context in which a message appears, has also received 
some attention. In this chapter, the definitions arising 
from message content, speaker intent and communication 
context will be applied to the brothel messages examined 
in Chapter Four. It will be seen that while most of the 
definitions offer certain insights into the nature of com­
mercial speech, none can distinguish commercial from non­
commercial messages with any reliability.
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Message-Based Definitions 
Perhaps the most common distinction proposed is to 
equate commercial speech with advertising, a form of com­
munication which generally consists of messages that pub­
lications have been paid to project. But such a definition 
founders on at least two grounds. First, an examination of 
the brothel messages reveals an implicit claim that the 
brothel messages in question have not been paid for. As 
already noted, while nearly every page in the booklets 
from which the messages in Figures Two, Three, Four, and 
Nine are taken are labeled "Paid Advertisement," those 
pages on which the brothel messages appear are labeled 
"Editorial." The implication is that these messages repre­
sent the editorial voice of the publishers of the book­
lets. Defining commercial speech as paid advertising, 
therefore, is underinclusive. By the same logic, a newspa­
per's commercial messages regarding circulation, advertis­
ing or employment opportunities could never be categorized 
as commercial speech as long as they appeared in the spon­
soring publication, since they were not paid for in the 
traditional advertising sense. In addition, there is the 
potential problem, again suggested by the brothel messages 
under discussion, of proving a given communication had 
been paid for by someone other than the publisher of the 
medium in which it appeared.
A second problem with such a definition is that the 
U.S. Supreme Court itself has rejected the notion that
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messages lose their constitutional protection if money has 
been paid to project them (New York Times v. Sullivan). A 
lesser standard regarding paid advertising might well 
threaten the protected constitutional status of political 
campaign commercials and other messages which are expli­
citly political, but nonetheless commercial in the sense 
that they have been paid for. Therefore, defining commer­
cial speech as advertising is not only underinclusive; 
such a definition seems overbroad as well, since the Court 
has chosen to exclude advertising in the public interest 
from the type of commercial speech regulation normally 
permitted.
Still, the first definition used by the Court, in 
Valentine v. Chrestensen. was based entirely upon message 
content. There, the Court defined commercial speech as 
"purely commercial advertising," a definition which seems 
very narrow if applied to Nevada brothel messages. Only 
the message in Figure Seven seems "purely commercial;" the 
rest have considerable non-commercial elements. That the 
Court itself did not apply its own definition to Valen­
tine's handbill in no way saves this definition. If such a 
definition's connotative meaning were actually to be 
applied, it would seem that advertisers need only add 
information or entertainment value to their messages to 
have them fall outside the category of "purely commercial 
advertising."
The inadequacy of such a definition should be even
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more apparent when one considers a later version of the 
same message-based formula, the one used in Pittsburgh 
Press. In that case, the Court declared that commercial 
speech was that which did "no more than propose a commer­
cial transaction" (385). Under this definition, only the 
brothel message in Figure One, with its statement, "We 
accept Visa and Master Charge," makes a reference to a 
specific economic transaction, and should be considered 
commercial. Not one of the messages mentions payment for 
or price of a specific sexual activity, factors which 
would seem to be necessary before one could meaningfully 
discuss a commercial transaction with a prostitute.
In general then, one can conclude that message-based 
definitions of commercial speech suffer from underinclu­
siveness. They fail to reach all but the simplest form of 
price advertising and are easily eluded by advertisers 
seeking to insulate their messages from government regula­
tion. This is unfortunate, because, as Richard Barnes 
claimed, such definitions are at least "objective" in that 
"all that need be determined is the speech's content"
(488).
Speaker Intent
Still, the Court has on occasion relied on definitions 
which turn on motive. Perhaps this represents an effort to 
remedy the underinclusiveness encountered when evaluating 
content only. Unfortunately, motive-based definitions are
even more troublesome than message-based distinctions, 
since they require subjective evaluations which go beyond 
the speech itself.
Obviously, a search for motives can be a difficult, if 
not impossible task. As Judge Clark asked in Chrestensen:
[H]ow can we say that plaintiff's motives are only or 
primarily financial? Is he just engaged in an adver­
tising plot, or does he really believe in his wrongs? 
We know how opposition to oppression, real or fan­
cied, grows upon a person, and we can suspect that by 
now, plaintiff regards himself as a crusader against 
injustice. . . . Indeed, we think it is a misconcep­
tion of the great freedom here involved to hold it 
more applicable to a group protest for abstract reli­
gious or political principle than to individual pro­
tests for concrete business injuries. Not such was 
the attitude of the founding fathers; was it not 
against a tax on tea that one of our most cherished 
blows for freedom was struck? (516)
Judge Clark's observations raise another problem with 
a motive-based definition —  that it is as overbroad as a 
content-based definition is underinclusive. Many forms of 
absolutely protected speech are presumably economically 
motivated, from newspaper editorials to labor demonstra­
tions. Certainly, one could argue that all the messages 
examined in Chapter Four are motivated by a desire to 
increase business at Nevada's legal brothels. Such a defi­
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nition, then, does not offer a way to distinguish between 
those messages that appear overtly commercial and the com­
mentary contained in Figure Six, which recites factual 
information and argues for the legalization of brothels in 
other jurisdictions.
The editorial in Figure Six is also a good example of 
how motivation is difficult to determine. One might argue 
that the editorialist seeks to enhance the reputation of 
legal brothels by pointing out their public health safety 
record. On the other hand, it can also plausibly be argued 
that the call for legalization of brothels in other juris­
dictions, if heeded, could have a negative economic impact 
on geographically remote Nevada houses of prostitution. 
Thus, the claim could be made that the content of the edi­
torial in Figure Six indicates its motive is to hurt 
Nevada brothel business by seeking the legalization of 
prostitution in more accessible locales.
Finally, a motive-based definition could lead to some 
disturbing anomalies. The messages in Figures Five, Six 
and Nine all mention public health and the safety record 
of brothels. In the Figure Six editorial, these statements 
are attributed to a Clark County Health Department offi­
cial. A motive-based definition would allow some publica­
tions to quote this official, but forbid the same quotes 
if they were published by those with an economic interest 
in brothels. By construing an underlying economic motive, 
those who would regulate speech could forbid one speaker
the right to disseminate information to which others 
enjoyed unfettered access. Motive, then, would determine 
the overall level of First Amendment protection afforded 
speakers, precisely the situation warned against by Jus­
tice Douglas in his celebrated Dennis dissent:
The crime then depends not on what is taught, but on 
who the teacher is. That is to make freedom of speech 
turn not on what is said, but on the intent with 
which it is said. Once we start down that road we 
enter territory dangerous to the liberties of every 
citizen. (583)
The Court's consideration of economic motive has not 
been limited to the economic interests of the speaker. In 
Central Hudson, in which the Court fully restated the 
commercial speech doctrine, commercial speech is defined 
as "expression related solely to the economic interests of 
the speaker and its audience" (561). Such consideration of 
readers' economic interests might call into question the 
legal status of such messages as a November 1980 Cosmopo­
litan magazine article, "Sex For Sale in Las Vegas." Pre­
sumably, Cosmopolitan had no economic interest in Nevada 
brothels. Without reaching the more problematic issue of 
whether the magazine's economic interests were served by 
publishing sexually titillating articles, thereby affect­
ing classification of the piece, one can assume its gener­
ally favorable description of a Pahrump brothel may well 
have impacted the reader's economic interests. Indeed,
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because the article explicitly listed the sexual services 
offered, under this definition it was, in the sense of 
describing a specific economic transaction, more commer­
cial than the brothel messages.
Such a definition, if the word "solely" were to be 
given any consideration, might also be as underinclusive 
as those which equate commercial speech with no more than 
a proposal for an economic transaction. The use of the 
word "solely" further underscores the notion that any 
entertainment or political function served by the speech 
removes it from the realm of the commercial.
One variation of motive-based distinctions which pur­
ports to eliminate at least some of the troublesome sub­
jectivity involved with discovering intent is commonly 
called the "primary purpose test." Here, the message 
itself is evaluated to determine the motivation behind its 
dissemination. But the problem with using a primary pur­
pose test to distinguish commercial from non-commercial 
speech was pointed out as early as Chrestensen by Judge 
Clark:
[A]t once we are faced by the question, "How much is 
primarily"? "Primarily" commercial presumably signi­
fies a test quantitative in amount; a limited dross 
of commercialism does not vitiate, though a more sub­
stantial amount may, and presumably will . . . Plain­
tiff's handbill furnishes a good example of the 
uncertainty, not to speak of unreality, of the sug-
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gested distinctions. (515-516).
A variation of the primary purpose test was suggested 
by Nadir N. Tawil. Tawil claimed his definition lay 
between the subjectivity of motive and the underinclusive­
ness of content. But the definition — "commercial Speech 
is an expression designed primarily to promote a commer­
cial product, service, or a business interest" (1027)
— seems only a restatement of the primary purpose test and 
is fraught with the same difficulties. Such attempts to 
separate primary from secondary motives are bound to fail, 
Tribe observed, since communicators are likely to want to 
both make money and convince others of the value of their 
ideas. Protection cannot be limited to those with altruis­
tic motives, Tribe wrote, because "it is unthinkable that 
[F]irst [A]mendment protection should extend only to 
saints." (892, n. 11)
Communication Context 
Another commonsense distinction between commercial and 
non-commercial speech is the context in which the message 
appears. Although the Supreme Court has considered context 
as a minor factor, if at all, it deserves examination, if 
only to emphasize its shortcomings as a definitional com­
ponent .
If considering context, one might be tempted to afford 
greater protection to the messages appearing in Figures 
One, Six and Eight because they appear in publications
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which conform to traditional notions of reputable media. 
Panorama and Las Vegas After Dark are traditional maga­
zines in the sense that they feature considerable edito­
rial content dealing with a variety of subjects of pre­
sumed interest to Nevada tourists. In contrast, the other 
publications deal editorially only with brothels, while 
the rest of the pages, those labelled "Paid Advertise­
ment," also concern themselves with sexually-oriented 
entertainment.
One must be careful, however, not give too much weight 
to such considerations, for they simply add another defi­
nitional problem to our inquiry: what constitutes "the 
press?" Donald Lively has examined these difficulties in a 
commercial context and has concluded, "The notion that a 
publication must be evaluated to determine whether it is 
part of the bona fide press is demonstrably dangerous" 
(862). For the most part, the Court has wisely avoided 
this issue. There is also the historical view, held by the 
Court, that pamphlets and handbills, far from being non- 
traditional media, "have been historic weapons in the 
defense of liberty" (Lovell v. Griffin 452).
Combining the Components
The Court has also, on more than one occasion, com­
bined the above-mentioned components into a single defini­
tion. In Biaelow. the Court noted that "[t]he diverse 
motives, means and messages of advertising may make speech
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'commercial' in widely varying degrees" (826). This is 
not particularly helpful, since the Court does not address 
the issue of where the line should be drawn between pro­
tection and permissible regulation. Even a cursory exami­
nation of Nevada brothel messages reveals they contain 
commercial elements in widely varying degrees, but this 
observation does not help separate commercial from non­
commercial speech.
In Bolaer. the Court looked for three factors, which, 
when taken together, were determinative of commercial 
speech: economic motivation, proposal to engage in an eco­
nomic transaction, and reference to a specific product.
But combining these factors did not alleviate their indi­
vidual shortcomings. Product reference and proposal to 
engage in economic transaction do not remedy the intract­
able problem of determining motivation.
Nor does this combination of factors help separate 
commercial from non-commercial brothel messages. As 
already noted, most of the brothel messages lack any spe­
cific proposal to engage in economic transaction. Such a 
definition then, is seriously underinclusive, since the 
lack of any of its three parts means the speech in ques­
tion in non-commercial.
Another combination of factors was advocated by Thomas 
Merrill, who suggested the following three-part definition 
of commercial speech:
(1) speech that refers to a specific brand name prod-
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uct or service, (2) made by the speaker with a finan­
cial interest in the sale of the advertised product 
or service, or in the distribution of the speech, (3) 
that does not advertise an activity itself protected 
by the [F]irst [A]mendment. (236)
Neither of the subsidiary second and third prongs of 
Merrill's definition need be discussed in detail at this 
point. Prong two is a motive-based test, the shortcomings 
of which have been discussed above. Prong three, which 
will be incorporated into the definition proposed in this 
thesis, will be discussed more fully in Chapter Six.
At first glance, Merrill's first prong, using specific 
product reference as a definitional component of commer­
cial speech, seems attractive. Like other message-based 
factors, it offers an objective criterion for distinguish­
ing commercial speech. (Although that objectivity is 
sacrificed in prong two, which perhaps Merrill feels com­
pelled to add in order to save his definition from over­
breadth. ) But while the initial objection to this is its 
potential overbreadth (specific product reference would 
categorize the above-mentioned Cosmopolitan article as 
commercial speech and could also apply to consumer publi­
cations) it also appears to be underinclusive. Only the 
commentary in Figure Six makes no specific product refer­
ence, but it would be easy enough to delete any reference 
to a specific brothel in Figure Seven, the only message 
whose status as an advertisement is not in dispute, with­
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out substantively changing the message itself. Neither 
does the third prong save Merrill's definition, since 
speech which concerned an activity not itself protected, 
like prostitution, would remain commercial, regardless of 
the circumstances surrounding publication.
The Question of Harm
What is notably absent from any of the above defini­
tions is an underlying justification for affording a 
lesser standard of protection to commercial speech. And 
while the Court has attempted to justify a lower position 
in the hierarchy of First Amendment values, the Court has 
never said commercial speech is per se harmful.
Simon claimed that this was a problem with prior defi­
nitional attempts, arguing that, "The notion that speech 
may be regulated or prohibited without a showing of harm 
is foreign to the spirit of [F]irst [A]mendment jurispru­
dence" (232). Implicit, then, in Simon's argument is the 
notion that for a separate category of "commercial" speech 
to exist at all, such speech must somehow be harmful.
Simon suggested that rather than continue applying the 
Central Hudson test, a test which allowed for the regula­
tion of non-harmful speech, the harm of commercial speech 
must be explicit in its definition (232). Such a defini­
tion, according to Simon, would require the government to 
show a causal link between advertising and the purported 
harm. Thus, Simon's definition of commercial speech was:
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calculated expression in the form of advertising or 
promotional material which is designed by the speaker 
to affect consumer purchases on the basis of informa­
tion or impressions contained therein resulting in 
action which is harmful to individual consumers or 
society as a whole. (244)
Simon's definition stands apart from the others 
because its use of the term "commercial speech" is unique. 
Most advertisements would not be categorized as commercial 
under the definition, unless specific harm could be shown.
A second troublesome aspect of Simon's definition is 
that there is also the source of the harm to be consid­
ered. Would the state of Nevada, in attempting to control 
brothel advertising, have to show merely that brothel mes­
sages increased business at houses of ill repute? Or would 
the state have to show that prostitution itself was harm­
ful? Is speech itself ever harmful, or is it only the 
action which the speech might engender which society ought 
to prevent? These questions are implicitly raised by 
Simon's definition, but never answered.
Simon's definition is inadequate because the answers 
to these questions remain open to debate. Also open to 
debate is his claim that "the effects of advertising can 
be reasonably predicted" (240). Persuasion is at best a 
murky science, and specific cause-effect relationships 
between message and audience behavior are rarely, if ever, 
quantifiable. Professor Don Pember noted that "there is
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little specific evidence, for example, that an advertising 
campaign can foist unwanted products upon an unwilling 
public. Evidence is also lacking that most advertising has 
significant impact upon most consumer purchasing decisions 
(Pember 56).
It is, of course, reasonable to argue that advertising 
must work, otherwise advertisers would sooner or later 
realize that their efforts were unsuccessful and discon­
tinue them. But Simon's definition could well require that 
courts decide questions of cause-and-effect better left to 
scientists.
In addition, Simon's definition provides no reliable 
way to distinguish between what he calls "advertising or 
promotional material" and what those wishing to dissemi­
nate brothel messages would undoubtedly call protected 
editorial copy. One is still left to decide by some other 
standard what exactly distinguishes commercial from non­
commercial speech. What Simon has done then, is not to 
define commercial speech, but suggest a new standard by 
which commercial speech cases should be decided.
Finally, commercial speech is not the only form of 
communication of which the Court has declared regulation 
permissible without a specific showing of harm. Despite 
continued controversy over the societal effects of obsce­
nity, the Court continues to permit regulation, if not 
suppression.
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The Speech/Action Nexus 
Each of these definitions has its shortcomings. Messa­
ge-based tests usually are underinclusive, and sometimes 
overbroad; motive-based formulations are also generally or 
so subjective as to be of little value. The primary- 
purpose test suffers similarly from the problems inherent 
in determining intent. Neither does combining the factors 
seem to take care of the difficulties encountered. If any­
thing, such combinations seem only to exacerbate the defi­
nitional problems, since rather than compensate for each 
other, each definitional component retains its weaknesses.
On the other hand, some of the commonsense distinc­
tions discussed in this chapter seem to offer help in 
defining commercial speech, in that they attempt to iso­
late some factor —  or combination of factors —  that make 
commercial speech different from other forms of communica­
tion. Discussions of motivation, as well as Merrill's 
emphasis on product reference, remind one that commercial 
speech is characterized by an intended economic transac­
tion. Message-based tests attempt to isolate some objec­
tive indicator of this connection between commercial 
speech and subsequent economic activity.
Several commentators have discerned this close rela­
tionship. Rome and Roberts have commented that "commercial 
speech is 'speech plus conduct'" (33). Although Simon 
seemed to ignore the importance of persuasion in other 
categories of speech when he observed that commercial
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speech "is the most intentional of all speech," it is cer­
tainly true that commercial speech is always linked to an 
intended economic transaction. It was Farber who offered 
the best-developed analysis of the link between commercial 
speech and economic action, when he discussed the contrac­
tual elements of commercial speech. Farber noted that 
"Similar to the language of a written contract, the lan­
guage in advertising can be seen as constituting part of 
the seller's commitment to the buyer" (387). After dis­
missing economic motivation and subject matter as distin­
guishing factors, Farber turns to the distinction that 
"the commercial speaker not only talks about a product, 
but also sells it" (386).
Such a reconception of commercial speech as speech 
brigaded with economic action should appeal to those on 
both sides of the advertising regulation issue. Those 
opposed to regulation would likely agree that contracts, 
either explicit or implied, ought not be protected by the 
First Amendment. Those favoring regulation ought equally 
to agree with Farber's observation that a "statute which 
prohibits the showing the contract to consumers in advance 
might raise [F]irst [A]mendment problems not unlike those 
raised by a ban on advertising" (387 at n. 70). Although 
this distinction does not seem to justify suppression of 
commercial speech, it certainly serves to explain such 
communication's lesser level of constitutional protection. 
The contractual aspects of commercial speech should cer-
95
tainly be truthful and non-misleading.
However, Farber's reliance on implied contract is lim­
iting. Surely, a contract between seller and buyer, either 
implied or explicit, is only one form of the relationship 
between commercial speech and economic action. An applica­
tion of this contractual perspective to the brothel mes­
sages will illustrate this point. The descriptions of 
facilities in Figures One, Two, Three, Four, Seven, Eight 
and Nine discuss a type of service available. A potential 
customer can reasonably expect a given brothel to have a 
large selection of girls, Japanese-style baths, a dungeon, 
handicapped facilities and/or other services described in 
the messages. Similarly, the health claims in Figures 
Three, Six, Eight and Nine imply a contract: a customer 
can expect that prostitutes working at a brothel have 
recently been examined by a doctor.
But are these the only explicitly commercial elements 
contained in the messages? The telephone numbers and maps 
prominently featured in several messages seem one of their 
most overtly commercial aspects. Indeed, as noted in Chap­
ter One, NRS 201.430 specifically mentions the "location 
or telephone number of a house of prostitution" as consti­
tuting brothel advertising. It is not a contract that is 
being implied, but a close connection of the type dis­
cussed above that such maps and telephone numbers consti­
tute.
Another way of defining this link would be as those
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elements of the message that enable the receiver of the 
communication to follow through with the intended economic 
transaction. William McGuire pointed out that an integral 
part of the persuasive process is providing one's audience 
with the skills necessary to put one's proposal into 
effect. In the economic marketplace, this translates into 
price or credit information and location and availability 
of goods and/or services. These, then, are the connections 
between economic speech and commercial activity. They are 
the specific tools consumers need before consummating 
transactions in the economic marketplace.
The recognition of this nexus as a distinguishing 
characteristic of commercial speech implies net only a new 
definition of commercial speech, but a reformulation of 
the commercial speech doctrine. The final chapter of this 
thesis will propose an heuristic definition of commercial 
speech which, it is hoped, will bring such communication 





To view commercial speech as that speech which is 
closely linked with an intended economic activity implies 
a difference between economic speech in the abstract and 
specific commercial exhortations. Constitutional scholars 
will notice this distinction is similar to that difference 
between advocacy of illegal activity as a general politi­
cal doctrine and incitement to specific illegal acts, a 
difference already recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Indeed, it is the central thrust of this thesis that if 
such a standard is workable in the political marketplace, 
it ought to be equally applicable to the economic market­
place. The line between commercial and non-commercial 
speech ought to be the line between abstract economic 
ideas and specific economic incitements.
This chapter briefly reviews the development of the 
above-mentioned standard in sedition cases and then pro­
poses a heuristic definition of commercial speech sug­
gested by the concepts articulated in these cases. It must 
be emphasized that this definition is intended as an edu­
cational tool; while it is hoped that the definition pro­
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vides insight into the nature of commercial speech, it 
does not operationalize the concept of such expression. 
Both the shortcomings and the advantages of the proposed 
definition will become clearer when it is applied to the 
brothel messages that have already been examined.
The distinction between abstract advocacy and specific 
incitement was first proposed by Judge Learned Hand in 
Masses Publishing v. Patton in 1917. After Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes advanced the "clear and present danger" 
test in Schenck v. United States in 1919, Hand complained 
in a letter to civil liberties lawyer Walter Nells that he 
doubted his standard would ever be recognized as law (Gun­
ther 750). But Masses has indeed become an accepted stan­
dard in such cases. By 1969, when the Court decided Bran­
denburg v. Ohio. Hand's Masses standard had become what 
Gerald Gunther called "a central theme" in sedition cases 
and an accepted part of constitutional law (722). The per 
curiam opinion in Brandenburg stressed that the law "must 
observe the established distinction between mere advocacy 
and incitement to imminent lawless action" (449).
At the time when Hand wrote his Masses opinion, it was 
customary to view seditious speech cases in terms of the 
potential effects of such communication:
[P]unishability of speech turned on its probable 
effect or tendency, on assessments of causation and 
consequences; talk of the 'natural and reasonable 
effect of the publication' was a characteristic way
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of framing the question. (Gunther 724)
Such a standard disturbed Hand, who sought a more 
"absolute and objective test" (Gunther 725). In Masses. 
Hand had the chance to attempt to articulate such a stan­
dard.
In his opinion in the district court case, Hand 
granted an injunction against the New York postmaster to 
the publishers of The Masses. a journal which opposed 
United States involvement in World War One. The postmaster 
had declared The Masses non-mailable as a seditious 
publication because it aroused opposition to the draft 
law. Hand ruled that it was not enough that the indirect 
effect of the publication might be draft resistance: "If 
one stops short of urging upon others that it is their 
duty or their interest to resist the law, it seems to me 
that it should not be held to have attempted to cause its 
violation" (540). Although Hand recognized it was possible 
to persuade through indirect means, he argued that any 
lesser standard would "involve necessarily as a 
consequence the suppression of all hostile criticism, and 
of all opinion except what encouraged and supported the 
existing policies" (539-540).
The Masses standard began to be incorporated into the 
Supreme Court's mainstream thinking in two opinions 
authored by Justice John Marshall Harlan. Yates v. United 
States and Scales v. United States involved the prosecu­
tion under the Smith Act of officers of the Communist
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Party. In Yates. decided in 1957, Harlan accepted a 
defense argument that the jury should have been instructed 
that the government had an obligation to prove the defen­
dants advocated unlawful action, not just abstract doc­
trine. And in Scales. decided in 1961, the Court again 
overturned the conviction of a communist leader on the 
grounds that no party member could be convicted as long as 
the organization advocated only abstract doctrine.
Finally, in Brandenburg. the Court combined the notion 
of harm implicit in Holmes' clear and present danger test 
with the Masses distinction between incitement and 
abstract doctrine. Since, as has already been discussed, 
harm is not an issue in commercial speech cases, the clear 
and present danger test is of little value to such cases. 
But the Masses standard, with its focus on message rather 
than effect, seems a well-suited tool for helping to dis­
tinguish between commercial and non-commercial expression.
With these distinctions in mind, then, the following 
heuristic definition is proposed: Commercial speech is 
that communication which incites its audience to engage in 
a specific economic transaction which itself may be con­
stitutionally regulated. Indicators of such incitement 
include specific product reference, price advertising, 
implicit or explicit contracts, or other information which 
facilitates the intended transaction.
Seeking such indicators of economic incitement seems a 
better approach than a subjective search for motive. It
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certainly seems in line with Hand's call for a test focus­
ing on the speaker's words (Gunther 721). The incitement 
standard is also superior to the primary purpose test in 
that it does not require that distinctions be made between 
primary and secondary motives; "objective" evidence of 
incitement in the speech itself is enough to classify the 
communication as commercial, regardless of the speaker's 
motivation.
In addition, commercial messages which deal with acti­
vities which are themselves constitutionally protected —  
abortion, religion and labor activism, to name but a few 
—  would also enjoy constitutional protection. Of course, 
the contractual aspects of such expression, such things as 
price advertising and specific product claims, would have 
to remain truthful and non-misleading. This would replace 
the subjective "public interest" qualification currently 
used by the Court to grant protection to some commercial 
speech with an objective standard that could be applied to 
all expression. This standard also seems to fit well with 
the most current formulation of commercial speech doctrine 
represented by Posadas.
This definition would also help avoid the problem of 
overbreadth when dealing with consumer publications and 
other correctly protected forms of expression, since such 
publications lack that close relationship between message 
and economic activity. Although they contain specific 
price and product reference, they lack the incitement to
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engage in a specific economic activity that characterizes 
commercial speech.
Applying the Definition
The advantages, as well as the shortcomings of this 
new definition of commercial speech can be illustrated by 
applying it to Nevada brothel messages with consistent 
results. The message in Figure One, taken as a whole, is 
commercial since it contains several direct links between 
message and action. The mention of a specific brothel, 
though not a distinguishing feature if considered by 
itself, is coupled with the notation "We accept Visa and 
Master Charge," providing consumers with the notion of 
where they can get the product and how they can pay for 
it. The map to the Chicken Ranch further provides access 
to economic activity, as does the phone number and nota­
tion that limousine service is available.
That the message is displayed as an "example" used to 
illustrate an article on the Princess Sea Industries case 
does not save it from being commercial. The Figure One 
"example" is actually a mixture of commercial and non­
commercial elements, and under the definition any economic 
incitement renders the entire message commercial speech.
As Barnes pointed out, "So long as the Court retains a 
separate commercial speech category, mixed messages must 
inevitably be classified as commercial speech" (485). But 
if mixed messages are invariably classified as commercial,
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this in no way threatens protected speech, since speakers 
always have the option of removing those commercial ele­
ments which the state may regulate.
Although mixed messages would be considered commercial 
in their entirety, it will illustrate the workings of the 
proposed definition if we examine individual elements of 
the brothel messages under discussion. The message in Fig­
ure Two, for instance, would be classified commercial, 
since it is a mixture of commercial and non-commercial 
elements. But if the maps and phone numbers which incite 
economic activity were removed, what remained —  the phys­
ical description of the Chicken Ranch and its "ladies"
— would not be considered commercial speech. Similarly, 
most of the message in Figure Three would be protected 
under the proposed definition, with the exception of maps 
and phone numbers.
A further example of the kind of line-drawing the def­
inition would facilitate is provided by a comparison of 
two similar paragraphs contained in Figures Three and 
Four. Protected under the definition would be the para­
graph in Figure Three which reads "The Cherry Patch, a 
mere 21 miles from the Clark County line, is perhaps the 
closest and perhaps the easiest of all Nevada's legal 
brothels to find. It's about an hour's drive from the cen­
ter of Las Vegas." This description of the location lacks 
the link necessary to render the speech commercial in that 
it is insufficient information with which to actually find
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the brothel. In contrast, in addition to the maps and 
phone numbers in Figure Four, three paragraphs (beginning 
with "From the Strip, take Interstate 15") contain infor­
mation specific enough to constitute a close relationship 
between message and the consummation of economic activity.
The message in Figure Six would be fully protected, 
since it contains no close relationship between speech and 
economic activity. Figure Seven, on the other hand, could 
be suppressed, under NRS 201.430, without endangering pro­
tected speech. Like Figure Five, Figure Nine contains 
information specific enough to be considered purely com­
mercial; otherwise it would be protected. Finally, Figure 
Nine would be protected speech, with the exception of the 
phone number provided for further information. Although it 
advocates a visit to Sheri's Ranch, it lacks specific 
incitement and provision of directions to get there.
Conclusion
Some readers may be troubled by the fact that the pro­
posed definition allows for the regulation of truthful 
information concerning the location of legal Nevada broth­
els. But such power seems inescapable under the Court's 
current formulation of the commercial speech doctrine, as 
articulated in Posadas. Since the state can outlaw prosti­
tution entirely, it may regulate commercial speech con­
cerning prostitution as well. Chicken Ranch owner Russell 
Reade wrote that "a large number of male tourists who
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visit Las Vegas . . . are interested in utilizing the ser­
vices of a prostitute. Nevada wisely, discreetly and 
quietly offers a legal alternative" (Review Journal 11B). 
NRS 201.430 allows the state a constitutional means to 
ensure its brothel industry remains quiet and discreet. It 
is not the purpose of this thesis to suggest the level of 
protection that ought to be afforded commercial speech. 
That is for other commentators to argue and finally for 
the Court to decide.
It is also important to remember that this definition 
is offered only as a first step toward resolving the dif­
ficult problem of distinguishing commercial from non­
commercial speech. Problems remain. In Chapter Five, it 
was stated that commerciality went beyond implied or spe­
cific contracts. Yet it is entirely possible to craft a 
hypothetical message which contains the remaining specific 
indicators of economic incitement listed —  specific prod­
uct reference, price advertising, and other information 
that facilitates an economic transaction —  which intuit­
ively seems to be non-commercial speech. The announcement 
of a protest to take place at a Nevada brothel, for 
instance, might include maps, phone numbers and even the 
observation that the business in question accepts credit 
cards, without being an incitement to engage the services 
of a prostitute.
However, such a hypothetical example does not neces­
sarily indict the conceptual value of the definition. The
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notion that there is a substantive difference between 
abstract economic thought and specific economic incitement 
—  and that this difference is at the heart of the commer­
cial speech problem —  is still valid. What the example 
does suggest is it is necessary to better identify the 
indicators of incitement before a truly operational defi­
nition of commercial speech is possible.
Another limitation of this study is that to replace 
"intent" with "incitement" does not obviate the need to 
draw an arbitrary, quite possibly subjective line between 
what is deemed abstract economic discussion and specific 
economic incitement. But at least the definition replaces 
the subjective search for motive with a somewhat more 
objective examination of potentially commercial messages 
themselves. And it is not a presumed intent on which the 
matter of constitutional protection turns, but rather the 
advertisement itself, giving communicators fair notice as 
to what is likely to constitute commercial speech. Still, 
it will require further study before the distinctions 
between intent and incitement are fully clarified.
In keeping with this emphasis on objective, rather 
than subjective indicators, the function of communication 
context in distinguishing commercial from non-commercial 
speech must also be more fully addressed. In Chapter Five 
it was pointed out that communication context added defi­
nitional difficulties to this inquiry, since it required, 
at the very least, that one distinguish the press from
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other forms of media. However, a consideration of communi­
cation context seems inevitable to prevent the definition 
from reaching communication which intuitively seems non­
commercial. This thesis, for instance, contains those 
indicators of commercial speech identified in the brothel 
messages. What keeps the thesis from being categorized as 
commercial itself is the larger context of scholarship in 
which it is presented. The same is true of consumer publi­
cations. It has already been stated that such publications 
lack incitement, but the reason they lack incitement has 
more to do with the context in which they present informa­
tion rather than with the presence or absence of any spe­
cific indicators. Under the definition, mixed speech 
— those messages which contain economic messages in a con­
text which does not suggest they are anything but commer­
cial —  would, as previously noted, always be categorized 
as commercial. But the inclusion of commercial indicators 
within a larger context does not necessarily mean even 
those portions of the speech containing those indicators 
should be labelled commercial. Operationalizing this 
notion of context will be necessary before the definition 
can be applied beyond brothel messages with any consis­
tency .
Application of the definition beyond the examples dis­
cussed in this thesis would be the next step in arriving 
at a more reliable way to distinguish between commercial 
and non-commercial speech. At this point, however, fur­
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ther problems would present themselves. Many modern adver­
tising messages appear to fall outside the definition as 
proposed; they seem to lack the specific product identifi­
cation or incitement to imminent economic activity to jus­
tify their regulation. It can be argued that economic 
self-interest mitigates against the widespread use of such 
advertising as a way to circumvent regulation, but "image" 
advertising remains a popular tool in the economic market­
place.
The more abstract nature of image advertising may mean 
such messages would never be considered commercial under 
the definition. But in a sense, these messages are unlike 
more traditional forms of advertising and perhaps should 
be entitled to a different level of constitutional protec­
tion.
It is the philosophical position of the author of this 
thesis that until such time as these problems can be 
resolved, it is better that some speech which might other­
wise be undeserving of protection escape regulation than 
to risk the possibility of controlling speech which ought 
to be protected. The major limitation of the proposed def­
inition seems to be that it is too narrow rather than too 
broad. But in the sensitive area of First Amendment 
issues, perhaps this should be seen as an advantage rather 
than a liability.
Finally, what makes the proposed definition valuable 
conceptually despite its many limitations is its potential
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for bringing together theorists of divergent perspectives 
and for bringing commercial speech itself within the 
,,mainstream,, of the First Amendment.
Those who favor limiting commercial speech protection 
need not worry that economic due process is being revived; 
the power of the government to regulate economic activity 
and speech closely linked with such activity is not 
threatened. Nor should those who worry about undue sup­
pression of protected speech have cause for concern. The 
proposed definition would protect precisely that kind of 
economic speech jurists and commentators have been worried 
about chilling. That concern has not been over the consti­
tutional status of price advertising so much as it has 
been over the possible suppression of other, more general 
economic speech which might be categorized as commercial. 
When Justice Blackmun wrote that he saw no need to force 
the hypothetical druggist in Virginia Board of Pharmacy to 
cast himself as a commentator on drug prices, he missed 
the point. It is commentary on drug prices, not the cost 
of the compounds themselves, which is beyond the legisla­
tive power of the state. Forcing the hypothetical druggist 
to discuss drug prices in the abstract puts the kind of 
speech in the marketplace that the Court has been eager to 
protect. Tribe has observed that "The entire commercial 
speech doctrine . . . represents an accommodation between 
the right to speak and hear about goods and services and 
the right of government to regulate the sale of. such goods
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and services" (903). The proposed definition allows for 
just that sort of accommodation.
The definition moves the commercial speech doctrine 
from what Tribe has called the "makeshift . . . and 
unsteady" (904) foundation of the case law we have 
examined in Chapter Two, to the stable and well-evolved 
doctrine which produced Brandenburg. Perhaps because of 
the Meiklejohnian bias shown toward political speech on 
the part of so many scholars and jurists, the problem of 
reconciling free speech and advocacy of illegal activity 
in the political realm has received considerable atten­
tion. The result is a well-articulated body of case law 
which serves as a reliable analytical tool with which to 
deal with future cases. That same analytical framework 
could be employed in commercial speech cases by adopting 
the proposed definition. After all, if the safety of the 
republic can be entrusted to the principles embodied in 
Brandenburg. then certainly these same precepts should 
ensure the integrity of the economic marketplace.
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APPENDIX A
244.345. D ancing  halls , e sc o rt serv ices a n d  gam bling  gam es o r  dev ices: 
L icensing  an d  reg u la tio n ; licensing  houses o f p ro s t i tu tio n  
p ro h ib ited  in  c e rta in  com ities.
1. Every natural person, firm, association of persons or corporation w ishing 
:o  engage in the business of conducting a dancing hall, escort service, or 
gam bling game or device perm itted by law, outside of an incorporated city, 
must:
(a) Make application to the license board of the county in which the  
business is to be engaged in, for a county license of the kind desired. The 
application m ust be in a form prescribed by the regulations of the  license 
board.
(b) File the application with the required license fee with the  county 
license collector, as provided in chapter 364 of NRS, who shall p resent the  
application to the license board a t its next regular meeting.
The board, in counties having a population of less than  250,000, m ay refer the  
petition to the sheriff, who shall report upon it a t the following reg u la r 
m eeting of the board. In counties having a population of 250,000 or m ore, th e  
board shall refer the petition to the metropolitan police departm ent. The 
departm ent shall conduct an investigation re la ting  to the petition and report 
its findings to the board a t the board’s next regular meeting. The board shall 
a t th a t  m eeting g ran t or refuse the license prayed for or enter any other order 
consistent w ith  its regulations. Except in the case of an application for a 
license to conduct a gambling game or device, the county license collector m ay 
g ran t a  tem porary perm it to an applicant, valid only until the next regular 
m eeting of the  board. In unincorporated towns and cities governed under the  
provisions of chapter 269 of NRS, the license board has the exclusive power to 
license, and  regulate the businesses mentioned in th is subsection.
2. T he board of county commissioners, and in counties having a  population 
of less th a n  250,000, the sheriff of th a t county constitute the license board, 
and the  county clerk or other person designated by the license board is the  
clerk thereof, in  the respective counties of th is  state.
3. The license board may, w ithout fu rther compensation to the board or its  
clerk:
(a) Fix, impose and collect license fees upon the businesses m entioned in 
th is  section.
(b) G ran t or deny applications for licenses and impose conditions, 
lim itations and restrictions upon the licensee.
(c) Adopt, amend and repeal regulations relating to licenses and li­
censees.
(d) Restrict, revoke or suspend licenses for cause after hearing. In an  
em ergency the board may issue an  order for immediate suspension or 
lim ita tion  of a  license, bu t the order m ust s ta te  the  reason for suspension or 
lim itation  and afford the licensee a  hearing.
4. The license board shall hold a  hearing  before adopting proposed 
regulations, before adopting am endm ents to regulations, and before repealing 
regulations re la ting  to the control or th e  licensing of the businesses 
m entioned in th is  section. Notice of the hearing  m ust be published in  a
newspaper published and having general circulation in the county a t least 
once a  week for a  period of 2 weeks before the hearing.
5. Upon adoption of new regulations the board shall designate their 
effective date, which may not be earlier than  15 days after their adoption. 
Im m ediately after adoption a  copy of any new regulations m ust be available 
for public inspection during regular business hours a t the office of the county 
clerk.
6. A m ajority vote of the members of the license board present governs in 
the transaction of all business. A majority of the members constitutes a 
quorum  for the transaction of business.
7. Any n a tu ra l person, firm, association of persons or corporation who 
engages in any of the businesses mentioned in th is section without first 
hav ing  obtained the  license and paid the license fee as provided in this section 
is guilty  of a misdemeanor.
8. In a county having a  population of 250,000 or more, the license board 
shall not g ran t any license to a  petitioner for the purpose of operating a  house 
of ill fame or repute or any other business employing any person for the 
purpose of prostitution. (1923, pp. 62, 63; CL 1929, §§ 2037 — 2040; 1959, p. 
838; 1961, p. 364; 1971, p. 11; 1973, p. 923; 1975, p. 562; 1979, pp. 20, 511, 728, 
730, 732, 733.)
CroM referencee. — As to location of 
houses of ill fame, see NRS 201.380.
CASE NOTES
Houses of prostitution no longer consti- Prostitution on an Indian reservation. — 
tute a nuisance per ae. -  Subsection 8 of this The Secretary of Interior’s decision to rescind a
section, when read in coqunction with subsec- tribal ordinance which would have permitted
tion 1, manifest! a statutory licensing scheme * ___  - _.. T ..
for houses of prostitution outside of incorpo- "oua** prostitution on an Indian reserva*
rated cities and towns, and this licensing tlon» on “*• grounds that prostitution is
scheme is repugnant to and, by plain and frowned upon by federal policy and the licena-
necessary implication, repeals the common-law ing of prostitution on a reservation would
rule that a house of prostitutionconatitutei a bring about a political reaction advene to the
nuisance per se. Nye County v. Plenkmton, 94 . . . .
Nev. 739,587 P.2d 421 (1978). arb,tf ^ r,and “ Pn«ous
Counties may ban prostitution. -  The ®v*n though prostitution is legal in parts of the
electorate of the county, through the exercise *hte and is a profitable economic enterprise,
of their prerogative to initiate county ordi- Moepa Band of Paiute Indiana v. United States
nances by initiative and referendum, have the Dep’t of Interior. 747 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1984). 
power to ban aU brothels; with but the one Cited in: Princess Sea Indus., Inc. v. State,ssr*n34£.,SS2*» hi.% *
a m d  l b  o a t h l  q u a S T u ,  ih . a w u ia  EoUrajnni.nt, I" '. * Clark County Liquor h
but dsmsiwfa Hm .ing in counties where Gaming Licensing Bd., 99 Nev. 811, 672 P.2d
brothels are allowed. Kuban v. McGimaey, 96 434 (1983); EDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 599 P.
Nev. 105,605 P.2d 623 (1980). Supp. 1402.(0. Nev. 1984).
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201.430. Unlawful advertising of houses of prostitution.
1. It is unlaw ful for any owner, operator, agent or employee of a  house of 
prostitution, or anyone acting on behalf of any such person, to advertise any 
house of prostitution:
(a) In any public theater, on the public streets of any city or town, or on 
any public highw ay; or
(b) Any w here in  any county, city or town w here prostitu tion is 
prohibited by local ordinance or where the  licensing of a  house of 
prostitution is prohibited by sta te  statute.
2. Inclusion in any  display, handbill or publication of the  address, location 
or telephone num ber of a  house of prostitution or of identification of a  means 
of transporta tion  to such a house, or of directions telling  how to obtain any 
such inform ation, constitutes prim a facie evidence of advertising  for the 
purposes of th is  section.
3. Any person, company, association or.corporation violating th e  provisions- 
of th is  section shall be punished:
(a> For the  f irs t offense, by a fine of not more th an  $500.
(b) For any subsequent offense, for a  misdemeanor. (1913, p. 135; RL 
1912 (1919 Supp.), § 1, p. 3379; CL 1929, § 10535; 1967, p. 481; 1979, pp. 
305,604.)
CASE NOTES
Constitutionality. — This section and NRS Prostitution is an activity which this
201.440 do not clearly contravene constitu- itate may choose either to regulate or to
prohibit entirely. Princess Sea Indus., Inc. v.
Indus., Inc. v. State, 97 Nev. 534,638 P.2d 281 State*97 Nev-534' 635 P2d 281 (1981).
(1981).
201.440. Unlawful to permit illegal advertising of houses of prostitu­
tion.
Any person, company, association or corporation who know ingly allows any 
owner, operator, ag en t or employee of a house of prostitution, or anyone acting 
on behalf of any such person, to advertise a house of prostitu tion in  his place 
of business shall be punished:
1. For the firs t offense, by a  fine of not more than  $500.
2. For any subsequent offense, for a misdemeanor. (1913, p. 136; RL 1912 
(1919 Supp.), § 2, p. 3379; CL 1929, § 10536; 1967, p. 481; 1979, pp. 305, 
605.)
tiona! principles as thus far articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court. Princess Sea
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